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LEAVING NO CHILD BEHIND (EXCEPT IN
STATES THAT DON'T DO AS WE SAY):
CONNECTICUT'S CHALLENGE TO THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S POWER TO
CONTROL STATE EDUCATION POLICY
THROUGH THE SPENDING CLAUSE
Abstract: The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 ("NCLB") conditions
the states' receipt of federal education funds on, among other things, the
creation of testing schemes for elementary school students and the post-
ing of test results. Although NCLB threatens the states' constitutional
power to set education policy, two provisions of the law could potentially
alleviate this threat: (1) an "unfunded mandates" provision prohibiting
federal officers from requiring the states to spend funds not provided by
NCLB, and (2) a provision allowing the U.S. Secretary of Education (the
"Secretary") to waive provisions of NCLB at a state's request. These provi-
sions, however, have not circumscribed the federal government's role to
the satisfaction of some states, prompting Connecticut, a state whose own
policies conflict with NCLB's testing requirements, to file the first state
NCLB lawsuit against the federal government. This Note argues that
Connecticut's claims that the Secretary's administration of these two pro-
visions violates the Spending Clause are valid. This Note then focuses on
the Spending Clause's prohibition of conditions that require a state to
violate any other provision of the Constitution, arguing that NCLB, as it is
currently administered by the Secretary, may force Connecticut and other
states to violate the Equal Protection Clause.
INTRODUCTION
On January 8, 2002, President George W. Bush signed the No
Child Left Behind Act of 2001 ("NCLB" or the "Act") into law at a
high school in Hamilton, Ohio.' The President sat at a teacher's desk
amongst a group of students and assured the audience that "the Fed-
eral Government will not micromanage how schools are run. We be-
President's Remarks on Signing the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 in Hamilton,
Ohio, 1 Pos. PAPERS 23 (Jan. 8, 2002) (hereinafter Remarks]. See generally No Child Left
Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 20 U.S.C. (Stipp. III 2003)). All references to individual provisions of
the No Child Left Behind Act will be to the U.S. Code.
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lieve strongly—we believe strongly the best path to education reform
is to trust the local people." 2
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 was enacted pursuant to
Congress's Spending Clause power; it conditions the states' receipt of
federal education funds on compliance with certain mandates. 3 Two
of the most prominent mandates require states that accept the funds
to develop and implement testing schemes, and to make those test
results publicly available. 4 The states and local schools are free to fash-
ion their own curricula and to determine what academic content to
include in their tests, but all such choices are made under the super-
visory eye of the U.S. Department of Education (the "Department"). 3
When NCLB became law, the President, Congress, and the U.S.
Secretary of Education (the "Secretary") all emphasized that the Act
allows states the necessary flexibility to tailor local policies to local
problems. 6 Nevertheless, some states disagree.'' Although the Secre-
tary may waive many of the Act's requirements when states request
exemptions, the Secretary is not required to honor those requests and
has in fact denied many. 8
2 Remarks, supra note 1, at 25.
3 See OFFICE OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., No CHILD
LEFT BEHIND: A DESKTOP REFERENCE 3 (2002) [hereinafter ED, DESKTOP REFERENCE],
available at http://www.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/nclbreference/reference.pdf;  see also
U.S. CONST. art. !, § 8, d. 1.
4 See Avi Salzman, A Fight over Ideas in Education Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2005, § 14CN,
at 5.
5 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (Supp. III 2003). Subsection (a) (1) provides:
For any State desiring to receive a grant under this part, the State educational
agency shall submit to the Secretary [of Education] a plan, developed by the
State educational agency ... that satisfies the requirements of this section and
that is coordinated with other programs under this [Act and other education
laws].
Id. § 6311(a) (1).
6 Id. § 6301 ("[The purpose of this title] can be accomplished by ... providing greater
decisionmaking authority and flexibility to schools and teachers in exchange for greater
responsibility for student performance ...."); Remarks, supra note 1, at 25 ("[S]chools not
only have the responsibility to improve; they now•have the freedom to improve."); ED,
DESKTOP REFERENCE, supra note 3, at 3 ("This historic reform gives states and school dis-
tricts unprecedented flexibility in how they spend their education dollars, in return for
setting standards for student achievement and holding students and educators account-
able for results.").
7 See infra notes 131-135 and accompanying text. See generally Caroline Hendrie, NCLB
Faces Hurdles in the Courts, EDUC. WEEK, May 4, 2005, at 1 (discussing states that have con-
sidered suing the federal government over NCLB); Salzman, supra note 4,
6 See 20 U.S.C. § 7861 (a); infra notes 148-160 and accompanying text.
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NCLB erects a federal regulatory framework over education, de-
spite a general understanding that the power to set education policy
has traditionally been reserved to the states.° Indeed, when the U.S.
Supreme Court rejected an equal protection challenge to state school
funding systems in the 1973 case of San Antonio Independent School Dis-
trict v. Rodriguez, the Court treaded cautiously in large part because it
recognized the value of local control over public schools. 10
Perhaps cognizant of the implications that NCLB could have on
the balance of power between the federal government and the states,
Congress included a so-called "unfunded mandates" provision in the
Act." Section 7907(a) provides that nothing in the Act shall be con-
strued to authorize an officer of the federal government to mandate,
direct, or control a state or a state's resources, or to mandate any state
to spend funds not paid for under the Act. 12
Despite this provision, Congress has not appropriated sufficient
funds for states to comply fully with NCLB's requirements." Con-
necticut, for example, claims that it lacks the $41.6 million necessary
to comply with the Act's requirement that testing be conducted every
year for elementary school students." Based largely on this lack of
sufficient funding, in August 2005 Connecticut filed a lawsuit, Con-
9 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (characterizing education as an
aspect of the states' sovereign power); Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch.
Dist., Westchester County v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207-08 (1982) (interpreting a provision
of the Education of the Handicapped Act so that the courts would not "overturn a State's
choice of appropriate educational theories"). See generally 20 U.S.C. § 6301.
10 See 411 U.S. 1, 43-44, 49-53 (1973).
" See 20 U.S.C. § 7907(a) (Supp. III 2003).
19 Id. The unfunded mandates provision was carried over from three earlier education
statutes enacted during the 1990s. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss at 20, Pontiac v. Spellings, No. 05-CV-71535 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 5, 2005).
The sponsor of the provision in the law in which it originally appeared, the Goals 2000:
Educate America Act of 1993, explained that the provision was meant to "put to rest the
concern that we are going to dictate from the Federal level that somewhere, some way, the
local and State Governments will find money for our dictates." 139 CONG. REC. H7741
(1993) (statement of Rep. Goodling).
19 See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, TASK FORCE ON No CHILD LEFT'
BEHIND FINAL REPORT, at ix—x (2005), available at http://www.ncsLorg/programs/educ/
nclb_reporthtm (noting that at least a dozen studies have been conducted to estimate
how much it costs the states to comply with NCLB's administrative requirements, and that
in the best case scenario federal funding marginally covers these costs).
14 Salzman, supra note 4. See generally CONN. STATE DEFT OF EDUC., COST OF IMPLEMENT-
ING THE FEDERAL No CHILD LEFT BEHIND AcT IN CONNECTICUT. LOCAL-LEVEL COSTS: PART
11 (2005), available at http://www.state.ct.us/sde/NCLB_Local—Level—Costs.pdf.
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necticut v. Spellings, against the Secretary over the Secretary's refusal to
waive the mandates that the state cannot afford to implement. 18
It was not only lack of funding, however, that led Connecticut to
challenge NCLB in court. 18 The lawsuit also reveals a clash between
two different approaches to education—the federal government's and
Connecticut's—and questions the extent to which Congress can use
its power under the Spending Clause to persuade the states to follow
its policies by offering federal funds. 17 Thus, in addition to challeng-
ing the Secretary's authority to withdraw Connecticut's education
funding for noncompliance when the state does not receive sufficient
funds to comply, Connecticut also alleges that the Secretary is uncon-
stitutionally coercing Connecticut into following federal policy. 18
This notion of "unconstitutional coercion" comes from the U.S.
Supreme Court's Spending Clause jurisprudence, most clearly enunci-
ated in the 1987 case of South Dakota v. Dole, under which the Court
generally has upheld federal spending legislation so long as it complies
with five relatively loose restrictions. 19 First, Congress's exercise of the
spending power must be in pursuit of the general welfare." Second,
Congress must condition the states' receipt of federal funds unambigu-
ously. 21 Third, the conditions imposed must be reasonably related to a
national interest, 22 Fourth, the conditions imposed must not violate any
other constitutional provision." And finally, Congress may not condi-
tion the states' receipt of federal funds in a coercive way. 24
Although challenges under Dole have almost always failed, in the
1997 case of Virginia Department of Education v. Riley the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit struck down a funding condition on
the grounds of Dole's second ambiguity restriction, and suggested that
the fifth coercion restriction might apply as well." Significantly, Riley
15 See Complaint at 1, Connecticut v, Spellings, No. 3:05-cv-1330 (MRK) (D. Conn. Aug.
22, 2005).
16 Salzman, supra note 4. See generally Second Amended Complaint, Spellings, No. 3:05-
cv-1 330 (MRK) (D. Conti. June 6, 2006).
17 See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 42-43; Salzman, supra note k.
18 Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 42-43.
19 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-12 (1987); infra notes 201-213 and ac-
companying text.
20 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 207-08.
23 Id, at 208.
24 Id. at 211.
25 See 106 F.3d 559, 560-61, 569-72 (4th Cir. 1997) (en bane), superseded by statute,
IDEA Amendments for 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, § 612, 111 Stat. 37, 60; infra note 281.
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was an education case. 26 Connecticut's lawsuit presents an even more
persuasive challenge to Congress's use of the Spending Clause, both
generally and to advance education policy. 27 For decades before Con-
gress seized the policy reins, education reformers worked toward edu-
cation equity on the state leveL 28 Although these reformers have had
only limited success, Rodriguez implies that their ability to experiment
with different approaches—in contrast to NCLB's one-size-fits-all ap-
proach—is imperative and, perhaps, constitutionally required. 2°
This Note uses Connecticut v. Spellings in two respects: (1) as a ve-
hicle for analyzing the constitutionality of NCLB under Dole, and (2)
as an illustration of the extent to which the federal government—
through the U.S. Department of Education—has become so entan-
gled in state decision making on education that the local control cele-
brated in Rodriguez is slipping away." Part I traces early education re-
forms, starting with the failed attempt to constitutionalize reform in
Rodriguez and ending with state court and legislative efforts." Part II
details the federal government's evolving role in education reform,
culminating in the enactment of NCLB, and also recounts the major
criticisms of the Act." Part III describes Connecticut's struggle to im-
plement NCLB's requirements, including its lawsuit against the Secre-
tary." To set the stage for Connecticut's Spending Clause claims, Part
IV traces the U.S. Supreme Court's Spending Clause jurisprudence
over the last seventy years." This Part also notes how the federal
courts of appeals, and particularly the Riley court, have handled chal-
lenges to federal spending legislation." Part V applies Dole to Con-
necticut's challenge." Finally, Part VI focuses on the fourth Dole re-
striction." This Part argues that, by refusing to waive the NCLB re-
55 See Riley, 106 F.3d at 560-61. Riley involved a challenge to the Secretary's authority
under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act. Id. at 560.
21 See generally Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16.
25 See infra notes 58-89 and accompanying text.
25 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 44, 49-50; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565-66 (expressing
concern that if Congress's power pursuant to the Commerce Clause were to become too
broad, Congress would be able to intrude upon the states' education power by regulating
each and every aspect of local schools).
" See infra notes 240-319 and accompanying text.
91 See infra notes 39-89 and accompanying text.
92 See infra notes 90-130 and accompanying text.
35 See infra notes 131-170 and accompanying text.
54 See infra notes 171-218,231-239 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 219-230 and accompanying text,
38 See infra notes 240-279 and accompanying text.
97 See infra notes 280-287 and accompanying text.
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quirements, the Secretary is putting Connecticut at risk of violating
the Equal Protection Clause as applied in Rodriguez because Connecti-
cut does not have sufficient funds to implement the NCLB require-
ments and those requirements also clash with the state's policies."
I. EARLY ATTEMPTS AT EDUCATION REFORM: THE SUPREME COURT
SENDS REFORMERS TO THE STATES
A. Reform Attempts in the Courts: School Funding Lawsuits
Almost thirty years before the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001
was signed into law, the U.S. Supreme Court turned education re-
formers away from the federal courts with its decision in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, applauding local control over
school districts for the diversity of approaches to education it allows."
Accordingly, reformers shifted to state courts with their school fund-
ing claims, where they were more favorably received. 40 Unfortunately,
the courts' institutional structure as a non-political branch of gov-
ernment inhibited their efforts to effect significant change in educa-
tion policy. 41
1. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez: The Supreme
Court (Almost) Shuts the Door Completely on Constitution-Based
Education Reform
In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Rodriguez that Texas's
school financing system, which had a disproportionate impact on
public school students in low-property-wealth districts in the state, did
not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 42 The Court specifically found that wealth, in and of itself, is
not a suspect classification entitled to strict scrutiny upon judicial re-
view. 45 The Court further found that education is not a fundamental
38 See infra notes 288-319 and accompanying text.
° See infra notes 42-54 and accompanying text. See generally 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Prior to
the Court's decision in Rodriguez, many commentators had predicted an upheaval in public
education similar to that following the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education. John
Dayton & Anne Dupre, School Funding Litigation: Who's Winning the War?, 57 WM). L. Rxv.
2351,2361 (2004).
4° See infra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
4 ' See infra notes 64-78 and accompanying text.
42 411 U.S. at 55.
42 Id. at 22-25; see infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
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right afforded explicit protection under the U.S. Constitution.'"
Thus, applying rational basis review to the state's school financing sys-
tem, the Court held that the system did not violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause because it reasonably furthered Texas's legitimate interest
in retaining local control over the state's schools. 45
In analyzing whether wealth is a suspect classification under the
Equal Protection Clause, the Court refused to accept the district court's
reasoning for finding wealth to be a suspect classification—that be-
cause, under traditional school financing systems, some poorer stu-
dents receive less expensive education than other more affluent stu-
dents, these systems discriminate on the basis of wealth. 46 This finding,
the Court reasoned, ignored two threshold questions: (1) whether it
made a difference for purposes of consideration under the U.S. Consti-
tution that the class of disadvantaged "poor" could not be identified or
defined in customary equal protection terms; and (2) whether the rela-
tive—rather than absolute—nature of the deprivation asserted by the
respondents was of significant consequence.47 The Court answered
both of these questions in the affirmative. 48
With regard to whether poor students living in low -property-wealth
districts constituted a class cognizable in equal protection terms, the
Court refused to extend strict scrutiny to such a large, diverse, and
amorphous class with none of the traditional indicia of suspectness."
" See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35. The Court rejected the respondents' argument that
education is a fundamental right under the U.S. Constitution because, without an educa-
tion, citizens cannot fully realize other, explicitly protected rights, such as the First
Amendment freedoms. Id. at 35-36; el. id. at 62-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (disagreeing
with the Court's assertion that a right may only be deemed "fundamental" if it is explicitly
or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, and arguing instead that the "fundamental-
ity" of any given right is, "in large measure, a function of the right's importance in terms of
the effectuation of those rights which are in fact constitutionally guaranteed"). A complete
discussion of the Court's holding that education is not a fundamental right is beyond the
scope of this Note. For further discussion, see Victoria J. Dodd, A Critique of the Bush Educa-
tion Proposal, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 851,863-67 (2001) (arguing that history, precedent, and
policy prescribe that the Supreme Court should overrule Rodriguez and establish a funda-
mental right to education).
48 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 55.
46 See id. at 19.
47 Id .
48 Id. at 25.
49 /d. at 28 rile system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have none of
the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or sub-
jected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of
political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process."). The respondents offered two other ways of defining the affected class:
(1) the comparative personal wealth of the students' families, and (2) district wealth. Id. at
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The Court was particularly reluctant to apply strict scrutiny because the
respondents had not provided sufficient proof that the poorest families
necessarily resided in the districts with the lowest levels of property
wealth." With regard to whether an absolute deprivation of education
was required, the Court reasoned that the Equal Protection Clause does
not require absolute equality; nor, in light of the infinite variables that
affect the education process, could any financing system assure such
equality except in the most relative sense. 51 The Court also questioned
whether quality of education could even be determined by the amount
of money expended for it. 52
In holding that poor students were not a suspect class and that
Texas's interest in retaining local control over schOol districts survived
rational basis review, the Court stressed the value in local contro1. 53
Stating that pluralism allows schools to experiment more freely and
citizens to participate more directly, the Court emphasized that no area
of social concern stands to profit more from a multiplicity of viewpoints
and from a diversity of approaches than does public education. 54
Since Rodriguez, the Supreme Court has not closed its doors to
education equal protection cases completely." In the 1982 case of
Plyler v. Doe, for example, the Court held that Texas could not abso-
lutely deny a public education to undocumented immigrants without
violating the Equal Protection Clause. 56 Still, such decisions have gen-
25, 27. The Court rejected both of these alternative classifications. Id. at 27-28. With re-
gard to comparative personal wealth, the Court held that even if the plaintiffs' proof sup-
ported the allegation that the less wealthy received less money for education, which it did
not, the Court would still be reluctant to grant suspect class status to a class so large and
diverse. Id. at 26. With regard to district wealth, the Court refused to extend strict scrutiny
to a class defined merely by the common factor of residence in districts that happen to
have less property wealth than other districts. Id. at 28.
56 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 23.
51 Id. at 23-24.
52 Id. at 23, 24 & n.56.
55 See id, at 49-53. For example, the Court noted: "[TJ he judiciary is well advised to re-
frain from imposing on the States inflexible constitutional restraints that could circum-
scribe or handicap the continued research and experimentation so vital to finding even
partial solutions to educational problems and to keeping abreast of ever-changing condi-
tions." Id, at 43. Acknowledging that almost every other state used a school financing sys-
tem similar to Texas's system, the Court further explained that "it would be difficult to
imagine a case having a greater potential impact on our federal system than the one now
before us, in which we are urged to abrogate systems of financing public education pres-
ently in existence in virtually every State." Id. at 44.
54 Id. at 50.
53 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982).
56 See id.
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erally been limited to absolute denials of education; they have not
been extended to educational inequity. 57
2. State Courts: Reformers Find New Hope with State Constitutions
and Statutes
With the federal courts largely closed off to educational inequity
claims, parents, students, and community groups turned to the state
courts and other theories to challenge school funding schemes and
state education legislation having a disparate impact on minority and
low-income populations. 58 The highest courts of most states have de-
cided at least one school funding challenge, with many state supreme
courts hearing protracted serial litigation."
Unlike the Rodriguez Court, most state courts generally have been
receptive to such cases." Courts have interpreted state constitutional
guarantees of public education as guarantees of educational oppor-
tunity, not of equal dollar amounts per students' Still, many plaintiffs
have successfully argued that disparities in property value among local
school districts have resulted in inequitable .funding levels, and thus
inequitable distribution of resources, among districts." Plaintiffs have
alleged state constitution equal protection violations, state constitu-
tion education article violations, violations of Title VI of the Civil
57 See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 461-62 (1988) (holding that deny-
ing an indigent student school transportation for failure to pay school bus fees did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause); Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 333 (1983) (hold-
ing that denying tuition-free education to students who live apart from their parents and
reside in the district for the primary purpose of attending the free public schools did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause).
ss See Dayton & Dupre, supra note 39, at 2864.
59 See generally Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); McDuffy v.
Sec'y of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (NJ. 1990);
Bd. of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Nyquist (Levittown), 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y.
1982); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).
s° See, e.g., McDaniel .v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 157 (Ga. 1981); Rose, 790 S.W.2d at
209; McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 519.
51 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 24 & n.56; Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929, 939
(Cal. 1976); Lujan v. Cob. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1018 (Cob. 1982).
62 See McDaniel, 285 S.E.2d at 157 ("(W)e know of no sister State which has refused
merits treatment to such issues, and we would regard our own refusal to adjudicate plain-
tiffs' claim of constitutional infringement an abdication of our constitutional duties."
(quoting Bd. of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Nyquist, 443 N.Y.S.2d 843, 854
(App. Div. 1981), modified, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982)1); Dayton & Dupre, supra note 39,
at 2377. But see Ex partefames, 836 So, 2d 813, 819 (Ma. 2002) ("(Wle now recognize that
any specific remedy that the judiciary could impose would, in order to be effective, neces-
sarily involve a usurpation of that power entrusted exclusively to the Legislature.").
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Rights Act of 1964, and "accountability" violations under recent state
legislative reform efforts. 63
The decisions handed down by the courts have had sweeping
consequences for children, parents, schools, and taxpayers.° School
funding litigation has prompted major funding changes, including
tax increases and the redirection of resources throughout decades of
serial litigation.° Although courts often have granted broad defer-
ence to legislative policies on taxation and school funding, many
courts have nonetheless seen it as their duty to interpret provisions of
state constitutions and adjudicate the constitutionality of school
finance systems. 66
Despite these sweeping consequences, however, plaintiffs' victo-
ries in the state courts have not led to widespread—or even limited—
changes in educational inequities.° Mere declarations that school
funding systems are unconstitutional have not substantially furthered
education reform; instead, such declarations have been followed by
little progress.° After several decades of continuous court involve-
65 See Serrano II, 557 P.2d at 930 (equal protection); Claremont Sell. Dist. v. Governor,
794 A.2d 744, 745 (N.H. 2002) (accountability standards); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d
273, 287 (NJ. 1973) (state constitution education article); Campaign for Fiscal Equity v.
State (ta), 655 N.E.2d 661, 669 (N.Y. 1995) (Title VI).
64 Dayton & Dupre, supra note 39, at 2397.
65 Id. at 2398. For example, the Kentucky Supreme Court made this declaration in Rose
a Council for Better Education:
This decision applies to the entire sweep of the system—all parts and parcels.
This decision applies to the statutes creating, implementing, and financing the
system and to all regulations, etc., pertaining thereto. This decision covers the
creation of local school districts, school boards, and the Kentucky Department
of Education to the Minimum Foundation Program and Power Equalization
Program. It covers school construction and maintenance, teacher certifica-
tion—the whole gamut of the common school system in Kentucky.
790 S.W.2d at 215.
66 Compare Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1018 (recognizing the need for judicial deference to the
legislature), and McDaniel, 285 S.E.2d at 165 (same), with Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 209 (recog-
nizing a judicial duty to adjudicate education funding disputes), and McDufft, 615 N.E.2d
at 519 (same).
67 See Dayton & Dupre, supra note 39, at 2405-06; John Dayton et al., Education Finance
Litigation: A Review of Recent State Iligh Court Decisions and Their Likely Impact on Future Litiga-
tion, 186 Eouc. L. REP. 1, 1 (2004) (noting that of the thirty-six states that have issued deci-
sions on the merits of school funding suits, nineteen have upheld the funding system while
seventeen have declared them unconstitutional).
66 Dayton & Dupre, supra note 39, at 2406 (observing that many states are closer to fis-
cal equity in education funding without litigation than those states whose courts have been
involved in serial funding litigation).
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ment in education "reform," funding cases demonstrate that reform is
difficult to achieve without political will. 69
The courts' institutional structure prevents them from determin-
ing—much less implementing—effective solutions to school funding
challenges. 70 One critic has commented that judicial restraint limits
state courts in several ways." First, it prevents the courts from "invent-
ing" rights that do not appear explicitly in state constitutions. 72 Al-
though all state constitutions contain an education clause mandating
some level of free public education, the level of duty imposed on the
legislative and executive branches varies from state to state and is
rarely clear. 75 Moreover, when state constitutions do, either explicitly
or implicitly, require the state to provide a quality education, judicial
restraint causes courts to pause before defining and enforcing that
standard. 74 Whether the courts view themselves as lacking the exper-
tise necessary to develop a standard, or view themselves as incapable
of enforcing a standard, they typically have deferred to the political
branches in this area. 75 Even where courts determined some standard
and found that the state school finance system violated it, they have
been reluctant to order anything other than limited remedies. 76
69 See id.; see also James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely
Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. Rev. L & Soc.
CHANGE 183, 185 (2003) (rioting that rather than leading to equalization in funding
among school districts, school funding lawsuits have often led to reduced overall spending
on schools, as well as acrimony between legislatures and courts).
7° See William E. Thro, An Essay: The School Finance Paradox: How the Constitutional Values
of Decentralization and Judicial Restraint Inhibit the Achievement of Quality Education, 197 Enuc.
L. REP. 477, 482 (2005).
71 See id. at 482-84.
72 See id. at 482.
73 Compare MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 5, § 2 (mandating that a public education system be
established), and N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (same), with Ky. CONST. § 183 (mandating a level
of quality for public education), and N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4 (same).
" See Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1191 (Ill. 1996) ("What con-
stitutes a 'high quality' of education, and how it may best be provided, cannot be ascer-
tained by any judicially discoverable or manageable standards.").
79 See id.; Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 315 (Minn. 1993) (holding that the state con-
stitution required a minimum quality of education, but defining the quality standard as the
minimum standard for accreditation already used by the state board of education); see also
George D. Brown, Binding Advisory Opinions: A Federal Court's Perspective on the State School
Finance Decisions, 35 B.C. L. Rev. 543, 546 (1994) (arguing that state judicial decisions in
the education reform arena resemble a set of guidelines for the next, legislative step in the
process, unlike federal judicial decisions, which issue judgments designed to affect the
rights and duties of the litigants before them).
ra Thro, supra note 70, at 483-84; see Brown, supra note 75, at 549.
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Because courts continue to defer to the legislative and executive
branches, it is unlikely that school funding litigation in state courts
could ever lead to meaningful and lasting education reform; indeed,
the U.S. Supreme Court in Rodriguez questioned whether school fund-
ing is even related to student achievement at all." Nevertheless, this
type of litigation continues to wend its way through the courts, while
high-property-wealth districts retain or even increase their quality of
education and low-property-wealth districts fail to generate the popu-
lar and legislative support they need to overcome the political influ-
ence of high-property-wealth districts."
B. Reform Attempts in the State Legislatures: Education Reform Laws
In the meantime, some scholars have argued that the key to a last-
ing resolution to the school funding problem is to persuade the voting
public that making the goal of adequate education for all children a
reality is consistent with their own self-interest." In fact, rather than
continuing to bring school funding lawsuits, they argue, plaintiffs' re-
sources would be better spent on lobbying the electorate and the legis-
latures to eliminate educational disparities among districts—not be-
cause a court finds them unconstitutional, but because such disparities
are harmful to the whole community.s° School funding litigation can
be a useful tool for bringing reform issues to the public's attention, but
" See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 24 n.56, 47 n.101; Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1191 (deferring to
the state legislature); Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 318 (deferring to the state board of education);
Thro, supra note 70, at 484 (arguing that judicial restraint prevents meaningful education
reform). One scholar has argued, however, that courts recently have been crafting a new
and potentially effective role for themselves in education reform cases, by fashioning legal
standards that allow them to keep an eye on the political branches and to intervene by
exercising the "veto" of judicial review when they choose to do so. William S. Koski, The
Politics of Judicial Decision-Making in Educational Policy Reform Litigation, 55 HASTINGS L.J.
1077, 1230 (2004).
7s See Dayton & Dupre, supra note 39, at 2409-10. See generally Hancock v. Comm'r of
Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134 (Mass. 2005) (revisiting the court's decision in McDufb); Abbott,
575 A.2d 359 (striking down education funding legislation passed after the court's decision
in Robinson); CFE, 655 N.E.2d 661 (deciding state constitutional challenge to school financ-
ing system against the backdrop of the court's decision upholding the system challenged
in Levittown); Complaint, Conn. Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, No. CV-05.—
4019406-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 2005) (alleging that Connecticut's school financing
system violates the education article and equal protection provisions of the Connecticut
constitution).
78 Dayton & Dupre, supra note 39, at 2410.
8° See id. Emerging education reforms such as vouchers and charter schools may im-
pede efforts to persuade the public, however, if these reforms reduce the public's stake in
improving the state of public education. See id. at 2411.
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litigation alone is insufficient to bring about substantive, lasting
change. 81 In order to achieve a long-term leveling of resources across
districts and an adequate level of education for all students, these
scholars argue, plaintiffs must shift from the courts to the political
process, and attempt to build a coalition for school funding reform. 82
Indeed, some education reformers have done just that, and many
state legislatures have responded by mounting large-scale reforms of
their school finance systems." Some state legislatures have assumed a
larger role not only in regulating and contributing to local school
budgets, but also in articulating clear policy goals for public educa-
tion, a task that previously had been left to the local districts.84 To
leave some measure of local control intact, states have linked policy
areas like teacher education, teacher evaluation, academic standards
and testing, and other accountability measures to incentives and sanc-
tions, rather than mandating such policy choices." Nonetheless, ac-
countability reforms have somewhat reduced the discretionary deci-
sion-making authority of local school boards and administrators."
Unfortunately, these recent attempts at school reform by state
legislatures have not substantially affected educational inequities. 87
Some scholars have argued that state reform efforts have failed in this
respect because they do not affect power relationships or fundamen-
tally change schools' accustomed practices and organization." Never-
theless, the Rodriguez Court implied that the opportunities for ex-
perimentation and diversity of approaches that local control provides
outweigh such negatives."
81 See id.
82 see id.
85 See DAVID T. CONLEY, WHO GOVERNS OUR SCHOOLS? CHANGING ROLES AND RESPON-
SIBILITIES 3-5 (2003).
" See id. at 5.
65 See id.; Kenneth H. Bacon, Report Canis: Connecticut Grades Its Schools and Holds
Officials Responsible—.Statewide Tests That Focus on the Three R's Add Element of Accountability—
Writing: Theory and Practice, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 1990, at Al (describing the state's Con-
necticut Mastery Test system and how the system had been implemented).
66 See Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Schools, Communities, and the Courts: A Dia-
logic Approach to Education Reform, 14 YALE L. & PoCY REV. 99, 101 (1996); Bacon, supra
note 85, at Al (discussing the state's increased presence under the Connecticut Mastery
Test system).
R7 _See Rebell Sc Hughes, supra note 86, at 103.
88 Id. at 104.
69 See 411 U.S. at 49-53.
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II. RECENT EDUCATION REFORMS: THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT'S EVOLVING ROLE
In the face of only somewhat successful state attempts to achieve
educational equity, Congress has increasingly asserted itself in the edu-
cation policy arena in recent decades." More than thirty-five years
before the federal government extended its reach into the depths of
state and local education policy with NCLB, Congress passed the Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 ("ESEA"). 91 With Title
I of the ESEA, Congress intended to support the states in educating
impoverished, underachieving students. 92 Over the following years, as
the courts heard school funding litigation and the state legislatures
fashioned education reform legislation, the federal government's
supportive role evolved into a more dominant one." Ultimately, NCLB
was enacted in January 2002," The President touted the Act as a bar-
gain of "flexibility for accountability" between the federal government
and the states." Nonetheless, by enacting a comprehensive regulatory
scheme, Congress and the President have sent a message to the states
that the federal policy is the right policy, to which state policies will
take a back seat." Education reformers, scholars, teachers, and par-
ents disagree, however, about whether NCLB is the path to educational
equity.°
A. Early Federal Reforms: Title I of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965
The federal government's role in education policy largely began
with Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. 98
"See CONLEY, supra note 83, at 26-30.
91 See infra notes 98-107 and accompanying text. See generally Elementary and Secon-
dary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (current version at 20 U.S.C.
§ 6301 (Stipp. III 2003)).
92 See infra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
92 See infra notes 102-107 and accompanying text.
91 See infra notes 108-110 and accompanying text.
92 U.S. DEPT OF EDUC., THE No CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT OF 2001 EXECUTIVE SUM-
MARY 2 (2002), available at hup://www.ed.gov/nclbioverview/intro/execsumm.pdf.
99 See Press Release, U.S. Dept of Educ., Statement by Secretary Spellings on Recent Legis-
lative Action in Utah (Apr. 20, 2005), available at http://www.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/2005/
04/04202005a.html (stating in response to anti-NCLB legislative action in Utah that "(turning
back the clock and returning to the pre-NCLB days of fuzzy accountability and hiding children
in averages will do nothing to help the students who are currently enrolled in Utah's schools").
97 See infra notes 119-130 and accompanying text.
92 See Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, tit. 1,
§§ 201-212, 79 Stat. 27, 27-36 (current version at 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (Sapp, III 2003)).
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Title I provided federal funds to local school districts with high con-
centrations of children from low-income families." The law operated
narrowly to support the states in paying the extra costs of educating
"educationally disadvantaged" students.m° Congress later revised
ESEA with the Improving America's Schools Act of 1994. 101 With this
revision, Congress shifted its focus, requiring the states to hold disad-
vantaged students benefiting from Title I programs to the same stan-
dards as all other students. 1 °2
In recent years, federal influence over education policy has
grown. 1 °5 After the National Commission on Excellence in Education
examined the quality of education at the Secretary's direction and
released its report, A Nation at Risk, in 1983, the federal government
focused its attention more sharply on the discouraging state of public
education across the country. 104 As better research data regarding the
state of education became available, there were more opportunities
for national pronouncements of education policy. 105 Presidential ad-
ministrations and Congresses have seized upon these opportunities
99 See Elementary and Secondary Education Act § 201; INDEP, REVIEW PANEL, IMPROVING
THE. ODDS: A REPORT ON TITLE I FROM THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL 2 (2001) [hereinal-
ter IRP], available at http://www.cep-dc.org/pubs/improvingorldsreporttideUrp/improving
oddsreporttitleipanel.pdf.
100 1RP, supra note 99, at 2; see 146 CONG. Rec. S3232-33 (2000) (statement of Sen.
Gregg) (describing how Title I has operated in the past, and how NCLB improves Title I).
101 See generally Improving America's Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat.
3518 (current version at 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (Supp. III 2003)).
102 utp, supra note 99, at 3. States could either devise their own standards by state law,
or use standards devised by Congress in the Goals 2000: Educate America Act ("Goals
2000"). Id.; see S. REP. No. 103-292, at 7 (1993) (finding that there was a need for a frame-
work that supports state and local efforts to prepare all students to meet rigorous academic
standards). See generally Goals 2000: Educate America Act, Pub. L. No. 103-227, 108 Stat.
125 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). Goals 2000 at-
tempted, among other things, to prescribe a proper federal role in education policy. See
§ 2, 108 Stat. at 128-29; S. REP. No. 103-292, at 57.
100 See CONLEY, supra note 83, at 26-30.
0 °4 See NAT'L COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE
FOR EDUCATION REFORM 5-6 (1983), available at hup://www.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/risk .
html (concluding that educational performance was declining, in large part because of
disturbing inadequacies in the way the educational process is controlled); T.H. Bell, Ren-
aissance in American Education: The New Role of the Federal Government, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 771,
772 (1985) (describing the release of A Nation at Risk as a key turning point in education
reform); see also Debra Viadero, Race Report's Influence Felt 40 Years Later, EDUC. WEEK, June
21, 2006, at 1 (discussing a report commissioned by the then-U.S. Office of Education and
released in July 1966, entitled 'Equality of Educational Opportunity" but better known as
the "Coleman Report," that called attention to disparities in education).
105 See CONLEY, supra note 83, at 26.
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enthusiastically. 106 This more emphatic federal role is reflected in the
reauthorized Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965,
known as the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001. 1 °7
B. A More Comprehensive Role: The No Child Le, Behind Act of 2001
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 was initiated by President
George W. Bush and passed with overwhelming bipartisan support in
Congress.'m The Act embodies four key principles: stronger account-
ability for results, greater flexibility for school districts and schools in
the use of federal funds, more choices for parents of children from
disadvantaged backgrounds, and an emphasis on teaching methods
that have been demonstrated to work. 1°9 Unlike prior versions of Title
I of ESEA, NCLB applies to all public school students, not only the
disadvantaged. 11°
1. Overview of NCLB
NCLB conditions the receipt of certain education funds on the
states' compliance with federal mandates." These mandates particu-
larly emphasize state, district, and school accountability for the educa-
tion of their children.' 12 For example, each state must develop state-
wide standards for reading, mathematics, and science of challenging
academic content and achievement that apply to all children.'" In
order to measure students' achievement of these standards, the states
must design and implement annual tests. 114 States must make the test
results available to the public annually, disaggregated within every
state, district, and school by gender, major racial and ethnic groups,
English proficiency, migrant status, disability, and status as economi-
cally disadvantaged, so that interested parties can compare results
among these groups. 115 By the end of the 2013-2014 school year, all
105 see a
1117 See Id. at 27-29. See generally 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (Supp. III 2003).
105 See ED, DESKTOP REFERENCE, supra note 3, at 9.
log See 20 U.S.C. § 6301; ED, DESKTOP REFERENCE, supra note 3, at 9-11. This Note fo-
cuses on the flexibility and accountability principles.
"° Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 8-9.
121 See ED, DESKTOP REFERENCE, supra note 3, at 9-10.
112 See id. at 9.
113 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b) (3) (C) (i)—(ii) (Supp. III 2003).
1114
115 Id. § 6311(b) (3) (C) (xiii), (h) (1) (C) (i)—(ii).
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students in each group must meet proficiency as defined by the state's
standards and measured by performance on its tests. 116
The Act grants the Secretary the authority to waive its statutory
and regulatory requirements.'" A state educational agency requesting
a waiver must, among other things, describe how the waiving of a re-
quirement will (1) increase the quality of instruction for students, and
(2) improve the academic achievement of students.n 8
2. Criticisms of NCLB
NCLB's stated purpose is to raise expectations for low-income stu-
dents and to achieve educational equity. 119 Opinions are mixed, how-
ever, as to whether NCLB achieves a substantial step toward this goal. 120
Education advocates and members of Congress have attacked NCLB's
focus on testing as the method for measuring schools' progress, claim-
ing that testing narrows the curriculum by prompting teachers to
"teach to the test," taking time away from other valuable academic and
social activities. 121 NCLB also provides incentives for states to create
116 See id. § 6311 (b) (2) (F) .
117 Id
. § 7861(a).
118 20 U.S.C. § 7861(b) (1) (Supp. Hi 2003).
116 Id. § 6301 ("[The purpose of this Act can be accomplished by) ensuring that high-
quality academic assessments, accountability systems, teacher preparation and training,
curriculum, and instructional materials are aligned with challenging State academic stan-
dards so that students, teachers, parents, and administrators can measure progress against
common expectations for student academic achievement ...."); see 149 CoNG. REC. 5194
(2003) (statement of Sen. Gregg) ("(Tlhe purpose of this bill is to make sure kids learn.
These people who put these plans together are excited about the fact that they now have a
law they can follow which allows them to make sure that kids do learn.").
120 See infra notes 121-124 and accompanying text. See generally Pascal D. Forgione, jr.,
One Language: With Standards Comes a Requirement to Reduce Variability in the Quality of Instruc-
tion, QUALITY COUNTS AT 10: A DECADE OF STANDARDS-BASED EDUC., Jan. 2006, at 62,
available at http://www.edweek.org/ ew/articles/2006/ 01/05/ 17forgione.h 25.h tml (argu-
ing that standards of the type encompassed in NCLB are a necessary first step to closing
the achievement gap); Amy M. Reichbach, Note, The Power Behind the Promise: Enforcing No
Child Left Behind to Improve Education, 45 B.C. L. REV. 667 (2004) (arguing that although the
federal government has failed to enforce NCLB adequately and the states have failed to
comply fully with the Act's requirements, educational advocates should try to enforce the
Act's policies by bringing private lawsuits under third-party beneficiary theory). For exam-
ple, NCLB has divided leading national civil rights groups: many groups support the Act's
efforts to close achievement gaps and to hold schools accountable for student progress,
but some groups argue that the Act's sanctions stigmatize struggling districts without pro-
viding them with the necessary resources to improve. Karla Scoon Reid, Civil Rights Groups
Split over NCLB, EDUC. WEEK, Aug. 31,2005, at 1.
121 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 107-063, pt. 1, at 1240 (2001) ("[W]e remain concerned
that the bill goes too far in its reliance on standardized testing."); 147 CONG. REC. H137
(2001) (statement of Rep. Underwood) ("I am concerned about the overreliance of test-
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lower standards and easier tests so that it is easier to show progress, and
for states to allow underachieving students simply to drop out of
school.' 22 Moreover, although better student performance in core edu-
cation areas is desirable, comparisons between states are difficult be-
cause NCLB allows states to develop and use their own testing instru-
ments.'" Finally, some commentators argue that the federal govern-
ment must commit more money to implementing NCLB if the law is to
be successful. 124
Although NCLB advances many of the same policy goals as the
states' education reform legislation, state and local governments nec-
ing as the only measure of educational successes.... [Me must think about other ways to
measure the school environment than simple reliance on testing, just that alone."); Pun.
AGENDA, REALITY CHECK 2006: ARE PARENTS AND STUDENTS READY FOR MORE MATH AND
SCIENCE? 7 (2006), available at http://www.publicagenda.org/research/pdfs/rc0601.pdf
(relaying results of a recent poll, where 57% percent of parents thought their children
were already learning enough math and science); Michael Winerip, On Education: Teachers,
and a Law That Distrusts Them, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2006, at B8 (expressing concern that,
because they must spend so much time preparing for tests, students are not given the
chance to explore subjects they will really enjoy). See generally James P. Corner, Our Mission:
It Takes More Than Tests to Prepare the Young for Success in Life, QUALITY COUNTS AT 10: A
DECADE or STANDARDS-BASED Enuc., Jan. 2006, at 59, available at http://www.edweekorg/
ew/articles/2006/01/05/17comer.h25.html (arguing that standards-based laws such as
NCLB focus too much on academic learning and not enough on students' personal,
moral, and social development); Ronald A. Wolk, A Second Front: Betting Everything on Stan-
dards-Based Reform Is Neither Wise nor Necessary, QUALITY COUNTS AT 10: A DECADE OF STAN-
DARDS-BASED EDUC., Jan. 2006, at 49, available at http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/
2006/01/05/17wolk.h25.html (arguing that focusing entirely on academic and account-
ability standards is unwise in case this policy fails, and that policyrnakers should consider
building new schools to replace poorly-performing schools). For example, Connecticut
Commissioner of Education Bettyl. Sternberg has argued that some of the federal money
earmarked for testing would be better spent on programs like early childhood education,
because these programs have shown results in the past. Salzman, supra note 4.
lo See No Child Left Behind!, NEA TODAY, May 2003, at 20, 22 (arguing that NCLB pro-
vides schools with little incentive to prevent at-risk students from leaving school alto-
gether); Press Release, Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, Boehner Backs Secretary
Paige's Strong Stand on State Education Standards (Oct. 23, 2002), available at http://
edworkforce.house.gov/press/press107/paigeletter102302.htm (praising then-U.S. Secre-
tary of Education Rod Paige for taking a hard stance against those states that had lowered
their standards to hide low achievement levels in their schools); see also THOMAS Tool,
MARGINS OF ERROR: THE EDUCATION TESTING INDUSTRY IN THE No CHILD LEFT BEHIND
ERA 20 (2006), available at http://www.educationsectonorg/usr_doc/Margins  of Error.
pdf (suggesting that the federal government should, among other things, support research
on testing and create an independent national testing oversight agency).
' 2' See Dodd, supra note 44, at 857. See generally Diane Ravitch, National Standards: "50
Standards for 50 States" Is a Formula for Incoherence and Obfuscation, QUALITY COUNTS AT 10:
A DECADE OF STANDARDS-BASED EDUC., Jan. 2006, at 54, available at http://www.edweek.
org/ew/articles/2006/01/05/17ravitch.h25.html  (arguing that Congress should adopt
national standards, rather than allowing the states to set their own standards).
124 See, e.g., Dodd, supra note 44, at 853; No Child Left Behind?, supra note 122, at 22.
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essarily give up some control over their own public education systems
under the Act) 25 This loss of control, combined with insufficient
funding of the Act, has led some to complain that the federal gov-
ernment is violating NCLB's own "unfunded mandates" provision. 126
The states must, among other things, develop testing systems and aca-
demic standards, but the federal government has not provided the
states with sufficient funds to do so. 147 The federal government has
rebuked such claims, but complaints have not abated. 128
Ultimately, scholars, educators, and legislators disagree over what
policies and approaches will best lead to educational equity through-
125 See CONLEY, supra note 83, at 28-29.
126 See 20 U.S.C. § 7907(a) (Supp. III 2003); 149 CONG. REC. S100 (2003) (statement of
Sen. Durbin) ("When it comes down to it, you have the Bush administration on the one
hand posing for pictures and shaking hands with school principals across America and
with the other hand reaching into their pockets and pulling out their State funds to fund
his unfunded mandate under No Child Left Behind."). See generally Brief for the American
Ass'n of School Administrators as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Sch. Dist. of the
City of Pontiac v. Spellings, No. 05-2708 (6th Cir. Mar. 31, 2006) (urging the court to in-
terpret NCLB's unfunded mandates provision to mean that the federal government may
not require the states to spend their own funds to comply with NCLB); Brief for foe Baca,
Jr., California State Assemblyman et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Pontiac,
No. 05-2708 (6th Cir. Mar. 31, 2006) (same); Brief for Connecticut et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Pontiac, No. 05-2708 (6th Cir. Mar. 31, 2006) (same); Brief for
Edward G. Rendell, Governor of Pennsylvania as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
No. 05-2708 (6th Cir. Mar. 81, 2006) (same); infra note 135. The unfunded mandates pro-
vision states:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to authorize an officer or em-
ployee of the Federal Government to mandate, direct, or control a State, local
educational agency, or school's curriculum, program of instruction, or alloca-
tion of State or local resources, or mandate any State or any subdivision
thereof to spend any funds or incur any costs not paid for under this chapter.
§ 7907(a).
127 See 147 CONG. REC. 51143 (2001) (statement of Rep. Rodriguez) ("In the name of
accountability, more testing will be mandated with little financial support from the federal
government."); supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
126 See COLO. ASS'N OF SCH. EXECUTIVES ET AL., No CHILD LEFT BEHIND POSITION PA-
PER 8 (2005), available at hup://www.co-case.org/associations/779/files/White%20Paper
%20on%2ONCLB%204.5.05.pdf (arguing that schools should not be required to comply
with NCLB's requirements until the Act is fully funded); No Child Left Behind?, supra note
122, at 22 (noting that NCLB funding for 2003 fell $8 billion short of authorized levels);
What's a Promise Worth?, AM. TEACHER, Dec. 2003/Jan. 2004, at 6 (arguing that by setting
expectations high but keeping funding low, the federal government is practically asking
the states to fail to comply with NCLB's mandates); Press Release, U.S. Dept of Educ., New
GAO Report Finds that No Child Left Behind Is Not an "Unfunded Mandate" (May 25, 2004)
(citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, UNFUNDED MANDATES: ANALYSIS OF REFORM ACT
COVERAGE (2004)), available at hup://www.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/2004/05/05252004a.
html.
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out the nation. t 29 Despite this disagreement, NCLB mandates that
states comply with certain policies chosen by Congress, thereby con-
straining the states' and local districts' abilities to experiment with
other options.'"
III. CONNECTICUT CHALLENGES THE No CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT
Amidst scholarly and other criticism of NCLB, some states have
begun to resist the Act."' Last year, Utah's legislature passed a resolu-
tion giving state education law preference over federal mandates.'"
Colorado now protects districts in the state that opt out of the Act's
requirements from sanctions threatened by the U.S. Department of
Education and the state board of education.'" Some states, though
not joining or filing lawsuits themselves, are supporting other states'
and districts' challenges to NCLB.im
On August 22, 2005, Connecticut became the first state to file suit
against the federal government over NCLB.' 35 Connecticut's lawsuit,
129 See supra notes 119-124 and accompanying text.
1" See generally 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (Supp. III 2003).
131 See jeff Archer, Connecticut Files Court Challenge to NCLB, Enuc. WEEK, Aug. 31, 2005,
at 23.
132 H.J.R. Res. 3, 56th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2005); see Archer, supra note 13L
1" 2005 Colo. Sess. Laws 487; see Archer, supra note 131. Colorado has also resisted on
a smaller scale: in December 2005, taxpayers in the Kit Carson school district voted by
referendum to replace the federal funds the district will lose by dropping out of NCLB
with a property-tax levy. David J. Hoff, Cola. Town Raises Taxes to Finance NCLB Withdrawal,
Enuc. WEEK, Jan. 4, 2006, at 3.
134 See Archer, supra note 131; Letter from Peggy A. Lautenschlager, Wis. Attorney
Gen., to State Senator Fred Risser (May 12, 2004), available al http://www.doj.state.wi.us/
ag/5%2D10%2D04risserletter.pdf (analyzing whether Wisconsin could viably join litiga-
tion challenging NCLB, in response to a request from State Senator Risser). See generally
Brief for Joe Baca, Jr., California State Assemblyman et al, as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, supra note 126; Brief for Connecticut et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioners, supra note 126; Brief for Edward G. Rendell, Governor of Pennsylvania as Amiens
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 126.
133 See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 1; Archer, supra note 131. Con-
necticut attempted to persuade other states to join the lawsuit, but these efforts were un-
successful. Sam Dillon, U.S. Is Sued by Connecticut over Mandates on School This, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 23, 2005, at BI.
The National Education Association ("NEA"), joined by a handful of individual school
districts from several states, filed a similar lawsuit in April of last year, premised largely on
NCLB's "unfunded mandates" provision. 20 U.S.C. § 7907(a) (Supp. III 2003); Complaint
at 1, Sch. Dig. of the City of Pontiac v. Spellings, No. 05-cv-71535-DT (E.D. Mich. Apr. 20,
2005); see liendrie, supra note 7; infra note 162. On November 23, 2005, a federal district
court judge granted the Secretary's motion to dismiss the lawsuit. Pontiac, No. 05-cv-71535-
DT, 2005 WL 3149545, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 23, 2005); see Michael Janofsky, Judge Rejects
Challenge to Bush Education Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2005, at A22. The trial judge found
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Connecticut v. Spellings, focuses on a provision in the Act prohibiting
Congress from requiring any state or school district to spend any
funds or incur any costs not paid for under the Act—the so-called
"unfunded mandates" provision)" The state alleges that the federal
government is not providing enough funds to carry out its obligations
under the Act, effectively violating NCLB's unfunded mandates provi-
sion. 157 Connecticut also claims that the federal government is uncon-
stitutionally coercing the state to comply with NCLB's mandates)"
A. Connecticut and the Secretary Clash over No Child Left Behind's Mandates
Connecticut's lawsuit stems from a clash between the state's testing
scheme and NCLB's testing requirements. 1" For over twenty years,
Connecticut has implemented assessment and accountability measures
for its local school districts through its Connecticut Mastery Test
("CMT") statutory scheme)" Connecticut alleges that CMT has been
successful, as the state's students rank among the highest achievers in
the nation."' indeed, NCLB adopts some of the principles and ele-
ments of the CMT scheme.'"
that NCLB's "unfunded mandates" provision simply meant that no federal officer or em-
ployee could require a state to spend its own funds; the provision did not prohibit Con-
gress from doing so. Pontiac, 2005 WL 3149545, at *4; see infra note 162. He reasoned that
if Congress had meant to fund all of NCLB's requirements 100%, it would have said so
clearly and unambiguously. Pontiac, 2005 WL 3149545, at *4. The NEA has appealed that
ruling. See Brief for Petitioners, Pontiac, No. 05-2708 (6th Cir. Mar. 22, 2006).
136 20 U.S.C. § 7907(a); see Hendrie, supra note 7.
1 " Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 40-41; see Archer, supra note 131.
1m Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 42-43.
159 See Press Release, Conn. Dep't of Educ., Commissioner Betty .). Steinberg's Statement
on Department's Response to Connecticut's Requests for NCLB Adjustments ( June 22,
2005), available at http://www.state.ct.us/sde/nclb/important-press/BJS%2Ore%20June%
2022%2OUSDOE%201etter.pdf.
14D Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 1.
141 Id According to one recent study, Connecticut's students, as a whole, consistently scored
above the national average on the National Assessment of Educational Progress from 1992 to
2005. See State Ifighlights 2006: Connecticut, QUALITY COUNTS AT 10: A DECADE OF STANDARDS-
BASED Enuc., Jan. 2006, at 6, http://www.edweek.org/media/ew/qc/2006/17shcct,h25.pdf .
Connecticut does not rank as well, however, when its students' scores are disaggregated by race
and wealth (measured by school lunch eligibility). See id.; see also Letter from Margaret Spell-
lings, U.S. Sec'y of Educ., to Betty .). Sternberg, Conn. Comm'r of Educ. (Feb. 28, 2005),
able at http://www.state.ctus/sde/nclh/correspondence/ILetter2.pcif  (noting that C.onnecti-
cut's achievement gap is wider than the national average).
143 Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 2; see Bacon, supra note 85 (describ-
ing the CMT scheme and noting that, already in 1990, national policymakers had begun to
follow Connecticut's lead); Letter from Betty J. Sternberg, Conn. Comm'r of Educ., to
Raymond Simon, U.S. Assistant Sec'y of Educ. (Mar. 31, 2005), available at http://www.
state.ct.us/sde/nclb/correspondence/Simon —letter.pdf (describing the CMT scheme).
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There are three substantial differences between the CMT scheme
and NCLB that have led Connecticut to struggle with implementing
NCLB. First, Connecticut requires public school students in fourth,
sixth, and eighth grades to take the CMT in reading, writing, and
mathematics; NCLB requires that students be tested in math and
reading or writing every year from third grade through eighth grade
and at least once in tenth through twelfth grade. 145 Second, Con-
necticut grants special education students the option of taking the
CMT at the student's instructional level rather than his or her grade
level; NCLB largely requires testing at a student's grade level.'" Fi-
nally, Connecticut's CMT testing is only offered in English, though
the state allows English language learner ("ELL") students three years
in the U.S. school system before requiring them to take the CMT;
NCLB requires that ELL students be tested, in either English or their
native language, after one year in a U.S. school.' 45 Connecticut's
amended CMT testing statutes conform to NCLB's testing require- -
ments, but only to the extent that state funds are not used for NCLB
mandates.'"
Connecticut cannot comply with both its state education statutes
and NCLB's mandates as they are currently funded. 147 Accordingly,
the state has requested several times that the U.S. Secretary of Educa-
tion waive specific provisions of the Act. 148
On January 14, 2005, Connecticut's Commissioner of Education
(the "Commissioner") requested certain waivers from the U.S. Depart-
ment of Education's interpretations of NCLB's mandates in order to
maintain the state's own CMT scheme, including allowances for annual
testing to take place in alternate grades rather than every grade, for
143 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b) (3) (C) (v), (vii) (Supp. III 2003); Second Amended Complaint,
supra note 16, at 20.
144 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b) (3) (G) (ix) (11); Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at
21.
143 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b) (3) (C) (x); Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 21—
22.
1" CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-14i(g) (2005). Subsection (g) provides:
[M]astery testing pursuant to this section shall be in conformance with the
testing requirements of the No Child Left Behind Act provided (1) any costs
of such conformance to the state and local or regional boards of education
that are attributable to additional federal requirements of the No Child Left
Behind Act shalt be paid exclusively from federal funds ... .
Id. (internal citations omitted).
147 Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 4.
148 Id. at 23-24; see supra notes 117-118 and accompanying text.
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assessment of special education students at instructional level rather
than grade level, and for testing of ELL students after three years in the
U.S. school system rather than after one year.' 49 Connecticut's claimed
grounds for the waiver were the success of its CMT scheme and the lack
of sufficient federal education funding to comply with NCLB.'" On
February 28, 2005, the Secretary denied the waiver request for alter-
nate year testing and the three-year phase-in for ELL students, and she
took the special education waiver request under consideration. 151
On April 7, 2005, the Secretary announced a new policy for the
granting of waivers of the Act's special education testing require-
ments. 152 The new policy permits up to 2% of students to be tested us-
ing modified or alternative assessments.'" States that do not have an-
nual testing in every grade, however, are not eligible for the waiver. 154
Even if Connecticut were eligible for the waiver, the cost of de-
veloping and administering these alternative assessments would pre-
vent the state from taking advantage of the new policy.'" Thus, on
April 18, 2005, the Commissioner met with the Secretary and U.S.
Deputy Secretary of Education (the "Deputy Secretary") to discuss the
142 Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 24. Connecticut also requested an
allowance to conduct "cohort analysis," which measures student progress by tracking the
same group of students from year to year, rather than comparing one year's grade with the
same grade of the preceding year. Id. Connecticut had made similar requests as early as
April 2004, though as requests to amend the state's NCLB accountability plan rather than
as waiver requests. See Letter from Betty J. Sternberg, Conn. Comm'r of Educ., to Raymond
Simon, U.S. Assistant Sec'y of Educ. (Apr. 1, 2004), available at http://www.state.ctus/sde/
nclb/correspondence/Letter4.pdf.
Although the state requests to be relieved of its obligations under NCLB to administer
standardized tests and report the results in the third, fifth, and seventh grades, Connecti-
cut has claimed that it would instead use formative assessments in those grades. See Letter
from Bettyl. Sternberg, Conn. Comm'r of Educ., to Margaret Spellings, U.S. Sec'y of Educ.
(Apr. 11, 2005), available at hup://www.state.ct.us/scle/nclb/correspondence/Spellings.pdf.
15° See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 24-25.
151 Id. at 27; see Letter from Margaret Spellings to Betty J. Sternberg, supra note 141
("[W]e will not waiver [sic] in the implementation of the NCLB testing provisions.").
152 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Secretary Spellings Announces More Workable,
"Common Sense" Approach to Implement No Child Left Behind Law (Apr. 7, 2005) [herein-
after ED, Common Sense Approach], available at http://www.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/
2005/04/04072005.html.
155 Id.
154 Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 29; see ED, Common Sense Ap-
proach, supra note 152.
155 See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 29. At the end of July 2005, Con-
necticut received permission from the Secretary to test up to 2% of its special education
students under "alternative assessments." Id. at 34. Connecticut's policy of testing special
education students at instructional level rather than grade level, however, does not qualify
as an "alternative assessment" under the Secretary's policy. Id.
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State's waiver requests. 156 In response, the Deputy Secretary suggested
that Connecticut offer testing in every grade, but eliminate written
response testing in the third, fifth, and seventh grades. 157 The Com-
missioner found this "lower-quality" testing option unworkable. t58
In the following months, the Commissioner repeatedly renewed
Connecticut's waiver requests.mg Ultimately, on June 20, 2005, the
Secretary formally denied those requests. 10
156 Id. at 30. The Commissioner had written to the Secretary on March 31, 2005, re-
newing the State's original waiver requests. Id. at 28; Letter from Betty J. Sternberg to
Raymond Simon, supra note 142.
157 Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 31; see Letter from Betty J. Stern-
berg, Conn. Comm'r of Educ., to Margaret Spellings, U.S. Sec'y of Educ. (Apr. 22, 2005),
available at http://www.state.ct.us/sde/ticlb/correspondence/LetterSpellings4-22-05.pdf.
I" Complaint, supra note 15, at 19; see Letter from Betty J. Sternberg to Margaret Spell-
ings, supra note 157.
159 Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 32-34. For example, on May 18,
2005, the Commissioner wrote to the Secretary, noting that extensive scientific research
supported Connecticut's testing scheme, and that no research supported the position that
testing in every grade is more effective than alternate grade testing. Letter from Betty .).
Sternberg, Conn. Comm'r of Educ., to Margaret Spellings, U.S. Sec'y of Educ. (May 18,
2005), available at hup://www.state.ctus/sde/nclb/correspondence/LetterSpellings05-18-
attach.pdf; see Letter from Betty J. Sternberg, Conn. Comm'r of Educ., to Raymond Simon,
U.S. Assistant Sec'y of Educ. (May 27, 2005), available at hup://www.state.ct.us/sdeinclb/
correspondence/Sinion_letter527.pdf.
'0 Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 34; see Letter from Raymond Simon, U.S.
Assistant Sec'y of Educ., to BettyJ. Sternberg, Conn. Comm'r of Educ. ( June 20, 2005), available
at littp://www.state.ctusisde/nelb/correspondence/Simon_letter620.0f. In an earlier letter,
the Secretary had made clear that she would not waive NCLB's provisions requiring Connecti-
cut to test students in the third, fifth, and seventh grades. See Letter from Margaret Spellings,
U.S. Sec'y of Educ., to Betty J. Sternberg, Conn. Comm'r of Educ. (May 3, 2005), available at
h ttp://www.state.ct.us/sde/nclb/correspondence/SpellingsLettertoBetty5-3-05.pdf.
At one point, the clash between the Secretary and the Commissioner became quite
heated, when the Secretary challenged Connecticut's commitment to educating all of the
state's students. See Robert A. Frahm, Reform Flap Redefines State's Education Chief HARTFORD
CouttArrr, Nov. 28, 2005, at AL Using the mainstream media, the Secretary suggested that
Connecticut does not expect success from urban black children, characterizing Connecticut's
alleged attitude as the "soft bigotry of low expectations." NewsHour with fim Lehrer: Newsmaker.
Margaret Spellings (PBS television broadcast Apr. 7, 2005); see Margaret Spellings, Op•Ed, Test-
ing Serves Students, HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 20, 2005, available at http://www.ed.govinews/
opeds/edit/2005/03202005.html. The Commissioner demanded an apology from the Secre-
tary (which she never received). Frahm, supra; Letter from Betty J. Sternberg to Margaret
Spellings, supra note 149. Connecticut's governor wrote to the Secretary to express her of-
fense at the Secretary's comments and to defend Connecticut's policies. Letter from M. Jodi
Rell, Governor of Conn., to Margaret Spellings, U.S. Sec'y of Educ. (Mar. 31, 2005), available
at http://www.state.ct.usisde/nclb/correspondence/Letterl.pdf Even when not outright
insulting Connecticut, the Secretary has accused the state of shirking accountability under
NCLB and ignoring its achievement gap. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Department
of Education Issues Statement Regarding Connecticut Lawsuit (Apr. 5, 2005), available at
h ttp://www.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/2005/04/04052005 . h tml.
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B. Connecticut Files the First State Lawsuit Challenging No Child Left Behind
On August 22, 2005, Connecticut filed its lawsuit against the Sec-
retary in federal district court. 161 In its complaint, the state alleges
that the Secretary is violating § 7907(a) of NCLB, the so-called "un-
funded mandates" provision, by mandating, directing, and controlling
the allocation of state resources. 162 The federal funds the state re-
ceives are insufficient to pay for compliance with the Act, and the Sec-
retary has the authority to waive those mandates. 163 Nonetheless, the
Despite these comments, the Secretary has adopted some of the policies for which Con-
necticut has requested waivers. See, e.g., OFFICE OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC., U.S.
DEP'T OF EDUC., PEER REVIEW GUIDANCE FOR THE NCLB GROWTH MODEL PILOT APPLICA-
TIONS 1 (2006) [hereinafter ED, GROWTH MODEL], available at http://www.ed.gov/policy/
elsec/guid/growthmodelguidance.pdf. For example, on November 1$, 2005, the Secretary
announced a pilot program under which up.to ten states could apply to measure achievement
by student growth, similar to the "cohort analysis" that Connecticut had proposed. See Press
Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Secretary Spellings Announces Growth Model Pilot, Addresses
Chief State School Officers' Annual Policy Forum in Richmond (Nov. 18, 2005), available at
http://www.ecl.govinews/pressreleases/2005/11/11182005.htral;  supra note 149. On January
27, 2006, the Secretary released further guidance on the program, and twenty states have re-
quested to participate. Lynn Olson, States Vie to Be Part of NCLB's "Growth" Pilot, EDUC. WEEK,
Feb. 1, 2006, at 24; Diana Jean Schemo, 20 States Ash for Flexibility in School Law, N.Y Timus, Feb.
22, 2006, at B5. See generally ED, GROWTH MODEL, .51017.
let Complaint, supra note 15, at 1. At the same time that Connecticut asks a federal dis-
trict court to order the Secretary to, effectively, respect the state's policy choices, Connecti-
cut also faces litigation brought by its own residents challenging those choices. See William
Yardley, School Financing Is Focus of Lawsuit in Connecticut, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2005, at B6.
On November 21, 2005, fifteen students attending schools in eight Connecticut districts
filed a lawsuit in state superior court against Connecticut's governor, Connecticut's educa-
tion commissioner, and other top state officials. Complaint at 1-2, Conn. Coal. for Justice in
Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, No. CV-05-4019406-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 2005). In an-
ticipation of the lawsuit, Connecticut's governor appointed a commission to study the fund-
ing inequities alleged therein. Press Release, Conn. Governor M. Jodi Rell, Governor Rell's
Statement on ECS Lawsuit (Nov. 22, 2005), available at http://www.ct.gov/governorrell/
ewp/view.asp?A=1761&Q=306920.
t" 20 U.S.C. § 7907(a) (Stipp. III 2003); Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16,
at 40-41. The NEA's lawsuit, which was also brought under the unfunded mandates provi-
sion, was dismissed by a federal district court in November 2005. Pontiac, 2005 WL
3149545, at *5; see supra note 135. Connecticut's Attorney General, who initiated the state's
lawsuit, publicly stated that he finds the Pontiac ruling wrong and in no way legally binding
on Connecticut's lawsuit. Janofsky, supra note 135.
163 20 U.S.C. § 7861 (Supp. III 2003); Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at
41. Connecticut claims that it needs more than $41 million in additional federal funds to
comply fully with NCLB's requirements. Salzman, supra note 4. The Secretary, however,
has disputed this estimate. See Spellings, supra note 160. She contends that the testing
scheme Connecticut plans to implement under the Act is "entirely optional," because the
state could satisfy its obligations by administering less,rigorous—and thus less expensive—
tests. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 23-24, Con-
necticut v. Spellings, No. 3:05-cv-01330 (MRK) (D. Conn. Dec. 2, 2005); see Letter from
Margaret Spellings to Betty J. Sternberg, supra note 160 (IT] he system designed by the
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Secretary has refused to grant Connecticut's waiver requests, instead
requiring the state and its school districts to comply fully with the De-
partment of Education's allegedly rigid interpretation of the NCLB
mandates. 164
Connecticut also claims a violation of the Spending Clause and
Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 165 The state argues that
the Secretary is exceeding her powers under the Spending Clause and
violating the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution in two ways: (1)
by coercing the state to take actions that Congress could not other-
wise compel it to take; and (2) by changing one of the conditions pur-
suant to which the state accepted federal funds under NCLB, thereby
precluding the state from exercising its choice to participate in the
Act knowingly. 166
Connecticut makes several requests for relief.' 67 First, the state
asks the court to declare that Connecticut's failure to comply with the
Secretary's interpretations of NCLB's mandates does not provide a
basis for withholding any federal funds to which the state and its
Connecticut State Department of Education goes beyond what is required by NCLB, and
thus some of the costs of the system are attributable to state decisions in these areas."). In
reply to this argument, the Commissioner has stated that even if Connecticut were to
"dumb down" its tests, the state would still be short of federal funds. Letter from Betty J.
Sternberg to Margaret Spellings, supra note 159.
164 See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 41-42.
165 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, el. 1; id. amend. X; Second Amended Complaint., supra note
16, at 42-43.
166 Id. at 42-43. Connecticut also alleges that the Secretary's decision to deny the State
its requested waivers is arbitrary and capricious, contrary to constitutional right, power or
privilege, and unsupported by the record, in violation of the Administrative Procedure
Act. Id. at 43-45; see5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2000).
On January 30, 2006, the Connecticut NAACP and three other civil rights groups, on
behalf of three minority students in high-poverty districts, filed a motion to intervene in the
lawsuit on the side of the Secretary. Jeff Archer, Civil Rights Groups Back NCLB Law in Suit,
Enuc. WEEK, Feb. 8, 2006, at 15; Press Release, Lawyer's Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law,
State NAACP Seeks to Intervene in No Child Left Behind Suit ( Jan. 30, 2006), available at
http://www.lawyerscommittee.org/2005website/publications/press/press13006.1itml . The
group's president said the filing should not be read as an endorsement of the Department's
handling of NCLB; rather, the group fears that allowing Connecticut to opt out of the Act's
testing provisions will set a dangerous precedent for other states. Archer, supra. Moreover,
the group believes that by bringing the lawsuit, Connecticut is wasting resources the state
could use to reduce its achievement gaps. Avi Salzman, N.A.A.C.B Contests Connecticut Law-
suit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 81, 2006, at B3. The judge has agreed to hear arguments from the
NAACP, though he has not formally allowed the group to intervene. Matt Apuzzo, Judge:
NAACP Can Argue Against No Child Left Behind Lawsuit, BOSTON.COM , Apr. 17, 2006, http://
www.boston.com/news/local/conneeticut/articies/2006/04/17/judge_naacp_can_argue_a
gainst no_child_left_beltind_lawsuit/.
167 Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 46-49.
2006]	 Connecticut's Challenge to the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 	 1059
school districts are entitled under the Act. t° Second, the state asks
the court to enjoin the Secretary from withholding federal funds,
from withholding approval of Connecticut's plans, and from denying
any waiver because of Connecticut's refusal to expend its own funds to
achieve compliance with the Secretary's assessment requirements. 169
Finally, the state asks the court to order the Secretary to grant Con-
necticut's waiver requests.'"
IV. SOUTH DAKOTA V. DOLE AND THE SUPREME COURT'S
SPENDING CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
After reformers worked for decades in the states by filing new
lawsuits and developing new policies, Congress seized control of the
education reform arena by enacting NCLB pursuant to its power to
condition the states' receipt of federal funds under the Spending
Clause.m Not satisfied that federal policy is the right policy, Con-
necticut alleges that the Secretary has, among other things, exceeded
her Spending Clause authority under the Actin Unfortunately for
the state, Connecticut faces an uphill battle: since as far back as the
1930s, the U.S. Supreme Court has generally upheld spending legisla-
tion, with few limitations.'"
11" See id. at 46-47.
19 	 id. at 47-48.
17° See id. at 46. As of August 2006, the Secretary has filed a motion to dismiss the law-
suit and the court continues to consider arguments for and against the motion. See Con-
necticut v. Spellings, No. 3:05-cv-1330 (MRK) (D. Conn. July 31, 2006) (order granting
motion for leave to file second amended complaint). Many of these arguments involve
disagreement over whether Connecticut's claims are ripe for review and whether the court
has jurisdiction over those claims under the Administrative Procedure Act. See Reply in
Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 2-8, Spellings, No. 3:05-cv-1330 (MRK) (Jan.
13, 2006); Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 10-27, Spellings, No.
3:05-cv-1330 (MRK) (Dec. 23, 2005); Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss at 14-23, Spellings, No. 3:05-ev-1330 (MRK) (Dec. 2, 2005).
171 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; ED, DESKTOP REFERENCE, supra note 3, at 3. The
Spending Clause provides: "The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Du-
ties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and gen-
eral Welfare of the United States ...." U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, el, I.
172 Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 42-43. Although Connecticut also
alleges that the Secretary has violated NCLB's unfunded mandates provision directly, as
well as the Administrative Procedure Act, this Note focuses on the state's Spending Clause
claim.
I" See Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, the Spending Pawn; and Federal Criminal
Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 24 (2003) ("At first blush, it is difficult to discern any limits or
bounds to a power to 'provide for' or 'promote the general Welfare' of the Nation."); infra
notes 174-213 and accompanying text; see also Michele Landis Dauber, Judicial Review and
the Power of the Purse, 23 Law & HIsT. REV. 451, 452-53 (2005) (arguing that the Supreme
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A. The Early Spending Clause Cases
The U.S. Supreme Court struck down a Spending Clause statute
for the first and only time in 1935 in United States. v. Butlerrm In Butler;
the Court held that the Agricultural Adjustment Act, authorizing the
Secretary of Agriculture to impose taxes on farmers, was unconstitu-
tional. 175 The Court stated that Congress's power to authorize the ex-
penditure of federal funds for public purposes is not limited by the di-
rect grants of power in Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution.' 78
The Court found, however, that the tax unconstitutionally invaded the
powers of the states by regulating agricultural production within the
states."7 Thus, because the tax violated the Tenth Amendment, it was
not a valid exercise of the taxing and spending power. 178 As discussed
below, the Court later abandoned Butler's Tenth Amendment reason-
ing. 179
In fact, only two years later, the Supreme Court reined in the
Tenth Amendment implications of Butler in Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis. 180 In that case, the Court upheld provisions of the Social Secu-
rity Act that imposed a tax on employers with eight or more employ-
ees. 181 The petitioner had argued that the tax coercively invaded the
states' autonomy in violation of the Tenth Amendment, because the
provisions allowed employers a credit for up to 90% of the tax if they
made contributions to their states' unemployment funds. 182 This credit
Court began practicing extreme deference to congressional spending legislation even
earlier than the New Deal era, particularly in the 1896 case of United States u Realty Co.).
174 297 U.S. 1, 72-75 (1935); see Va. Dep't of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 569 (4th Cir.
1997) (Luttig, J.) (noting that the Supreme Court has not invalidated an Act of Congress
under the Spending Clause since Butler), superseded by statute, IDEA Amendments for 1997,
Pub. L. No. 105-17, § 612, 111 Stat. 37, 60. Although the Court has not struck down a law
in its entirety since Butler, the Court has occasionally refused to extend a law's reach on
Spending Clause grounds. See, e.g., Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126
S. Ct. 2455, 2461 (2006); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17
(1981).
178 See 297 U.S. at 72-75.
178 See id. at 65-67.
177 See id. at 68.
178 See id. at 74-78.
178 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 180 (2001); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5b, at 836 (3d ed. 2000); see infra notes 180-218 and
accompanying text. But see South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 215-17 (1987) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting); Riley, 106 F.3d at 569-72 (Luttig, J.); infra notes 228-230 and accompanying
text.
18° See 301 U.S. 548, 589-90 (1937).
181 See id. at 592-93.
181 See id. at 585-86.
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effectively led the states, most of which did not have unemployment
programs prior to the Social Security Act, to establish such pro-
grams. l83
In responding to the petitioner's contention, the Court noted the
"national" dimensions of the unemployment problem at the time the
Social Security Act was passed, as well as the states' inability to address
this problem sufficiently because of their poor economic positions. 184
The provision allowing for the tax credit did not coerce the states into
developing unemployment funds, the Court reasoned; rather, it gave
the states a motive for doing so, which was not inconsistent with the
Tenth Amendment. 183 The Court did not, however, completely rule
out the possibility that a state might be unconstitutionally coerced by
some future exercise of the spending power. 186
B. The Court Considers Conditions on Grants to the States
In the years following Butler and Steward Machine Co., the Court
largely deferred to Congress when reviewing challenges to exercises
of the spending power. 187 This was the case even as Congress began to
impose conditions on grants to state and local governments. 188 In
1947 in Oklahoma v. Civil Service Commission, for example, the Supreme
Court upheld a provision of the Hatch Act, which granted federal
funds to state governments on the condition that the states adopt civil
service systems and limit the political activities of some government
workers. 188 The Court reasoned that Congress's power to set condi-
tions for the receipt of federal funds is broad, extending even to areas
1" Id. at 587-88.
1" See id. at 586-88.
I" Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 589-90.
166 See id. at 590. The Court stated:
Nothing in the case suggests the exertion of a power akin to undue influence,
if we assume that such a concept can ever be applied with fitness to the rela-
tions between state and nation. Even on that assumption the location of the
point at which pressure turns into compulsion, and ceases to be inducement,
would he a question of degree, at times, perhaps, of fact.
Id.
1117 See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937) ("The discretion belongs to Con-
gress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of
judgment."); see also Steward Machine Co., 301 U.S. at 583 ("We find no basis for a holding
that the power [of taxation] which belongs by accepted practice to the Legislatures of the
states, has been denied by the Constitution to the Congress of the nation.").
186 	 generally Oklahoma v Civil Serv. Comm' n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
189 See id. at 143-44.
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that Congress might not otherwise have the power to regulate)" The
Tenth Amendment does not bar exercises of such power, the Court
stated, because the states can simply refuse to comply by declining the
conditioned federal funds. 191
In 1981 in Pennhurst State School & Hospital u Halderman, however,
the Court limited this power somewhat when it held that conditions on
grants to states and local governments must be expressly stated. 192 In
Pennhurst, the Court held that Pennsylvania, which operated the peti-
tioner-hospital, could not be liable in a civil suit brought by a patient
for violating a bill of patients' rights included in the Developmentally
Disabled and Bill of Rights Act because Congress had not expressly re-
quired the states to follow the bill of rights as a condition for grants
under the statute) 93 The Court reasoned that legislation enacted pur-
suant to the spending power is much in the nature of a contract: in re-
turn for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally im-
posed conditions." 194 Thus, the constitutionality of Congress's exercise
of the spending power depended on whether the state voluntarily and
knowingly accepted the terms of the contract, and the Court found that
Pennsylvania had not so accepted the bill of rights. t95
C. The Modern Rule: South Dakota v. Dole
In 1987 in South Dakota v. Dole, the Supreme Court tied together
its earlier spending cases. 196 In Dole, the Court upheld a federal stat-
ute that conditioned the receipt of federal highway funds on the
states' implementation of a minimum drinking age of twenty-one. 197
The Court reiterated that, incident to the Spending Clause, Congress
may attain objectives that are otherwise not considered within its
enumerated powers by conditioning federal grants.'" Still, the spend-
ing power is not unlimited.'" Accordingly, the Court listed five gen-
199 Id. at 143 ("While the United States is not concerned with, and has no•power to
regulate, local political activities as such of state officials, it does have power to fix the
terms upon which its money allotments to states shall be disbursed.").
191 See id.
192 See 451 U.S. at 17.
195 See id. at 18-19.
I" Id. at 17.
195 See id. at 17-18.
1" See 483 U.S. at 207-12.
197 See id. at 208-10.
199 Id. at 207.
199 Id
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eral restrictions on Congress's power to impose conditions on the
states in exchange for the receipt of federal funds. 20°
First, Congress must exercise the spending power in pursuit of
the general welfare."' Courts, however, should substantially defer to
Congress in determining whether a particular expenditure is in-
tended to serve a public purpose. 2°2 Second, when Congress condi-
tions the states' receipt of federal funds, it must do so unambigu-
ously. 203 Third, the conditions imposed must be reasonably related to
a federal interest in particular national prograrns. 204 Fourth, the con-
ditions must not violate any other constitutional provision. 205 The
Tenth Amendment alone does not act as a constitutional bar; rather,
the Court described this last restriction as the unexceptionable
proposition that the power may not be used to induce the states to
engage in activities that would themselves be unconstitutional. 205
213° Id. at 207.-12.
201 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207; see Butler, 297 U.S. at 65.
2°2 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207; see Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640-41.
2°5 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207; see Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17.
244 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08. But see id. at 213-17 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the condition must not only be related to a federal interest, but also more narrowly to
the federal spending itself); infra notes 216-218 and accompanying text.
"5 We, 483 U.S. at 208.
206 See id. at 210; see also Oklahoma, 330 U.S. at 143. As examples of the type of condi-
tion that would violate this fourth restriction, the Court offered a grant of federal funds
conditioned on invidiously discriminatory state action, or on the infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment. Dole, 483 U.S. at 210-11; cf. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539
U.S. 194, 214 (2003) {upholding condition on public libraries' receipt of federal funds
requiring them to use filtering software on their computers to block access to obscene
material on the Internet, because libraries' use of the software did not violate patrons'
First Amendment rights, and thus the condition did not induce the libraries to violate the
Constitution).
In applying these four restrictions to the case before it, the Supreme Court held that
the minimum drinking age condition was not problematic. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208. The
Court easily concluded that the condition served the general welfare because the incentive
for young people to drink and drive created by differing drinking ages amongst the states
was an interstate problem requiring a national solution. Id. Moreover, the condition could
not have been more clearly stated, and was related to a national concern: safe interstate
travel. Id. at 208-09. Finally, the Twenty-first Amendment did not constitute an independ-
ent constitutional bar to Congress's power to impose the condition upon the states under
the Spending Clause. Id. at 209-10. Although it acknowledged that the Twenty-first
Amendment prohibits direct regulation of drinking ages by Congress, the Court, citing
Butler, reasoned that the constitutional limitations on conditions imposed by Congress on
the states pursuant to the Spending Clause are less exacting than those limitations at play
when Congress directly regulates the states under any of its other powers. Id. at 209. But see
Am. Library Ass 'n, 539 U.S. at 226-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that a federal statute
penalizing a library for failing to install filtering software on its computers would unques-
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The Court's fifth restriction was more elusive, and was described in
later cases by the lower courts as the coercion theory. 207 Citing Steward
Machine Co., the Court noted that its previous decisions had recognized
that Congress's conditioning of federal funds might be so coercive in
some situations as to pass the point at which "pressure turns into com-
pulsion."2°8 In such situations, the condition would violate the Tenth
Amendment. 209 In the case before it, however, the Court found the co-
ercion theory to be "more rhetoric than fact." "0 That most of the states
had complied with the minimum drinking age condition in order to
receive federal highway funds was not evidence of coercion, the Court
reasoned."' Rather, the minimum drinking age condition was "rela-
tively mild encouragement." 212 The Court reached this conclusion par-
ticularly because any state refusing to establish a minimum drinking
age of twenty-one would stand to lose only a relatively small percent-
age—five percent—of federal highway funds. 215
Justice O'Connor dissented in Dole, finding the minimum drink-
ing age condition an unconstitutional attempt to regulate the sale of
liquor, rather than a condition on spending reasonably related to the
expenditure of federal funds as the majority held. 214 She agreed with
the majority's articulation of the general restrictions on Congress's
spending power, and that the minimum drinking age condition did
not violate the "general welfare" and "unambiguous" restrictions. 2 t5
tionably violate the First Amendment, and that threatening to deny benefits can be just as
pernicious an abridgement of speech as direct regulation).
207 Dole, 483 U.S. at 211; see West Virginia v. U.S. Elep't of Health & Human Servs„ 289
F.3d 281, 288 (4th Cir. 2002); Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 2000);
Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 447 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 687 (1999) (noting that In cases involv-
ing conditions attached to federal funding, [the Court has] acknowledged that the 'finan-
cial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which
pressure turns into compulsion'" (quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at 211)).
203 Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (citing Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 590).
209 see id.
21° Id.; see Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 589-90.
211 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 211.
112 Id.
913 Id.
214 Id. at 212 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan also dissented, arguing that
the power to regulate the purchase of liquor was clearly reserved to the states, and that the
Twenty-first Amendment itself strikes the proper balance between federal and state author-
ity. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
215 Id. at 213 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor also stated that she was will-
ing to assume that the Twenty-first Amendment did not constitute an independent consti-
tutional bar to the minimum drinking age condition. Id.
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Still, Justice O'Connor found the majority's application of the "rea-
sonable relation" condition unconvincing. 216
Although the majority held that Congress's interest in safe inter-
state travel was sufficiently related to the minimum drinking age con-
dition, Justice O'Connor argued that the condition was too over- and
under-inclusive. 2" Justice O'Connor warned that if Congress is able to
regulate activity within the states that has only an attenuated relation-
ship to a federal interest, then Congress would have the power to ef-
fectively regulate almost any area of a state's social, political, and eco-
nomic life, 218
D. Virginia Department of Education v. Riley: The Fourth Circuit Strikes
Down a Spending Condition and Hints at Reviving the Coercion Test
Despite Justice O'Connor's warning, not only has the Supreme
Court repeatedly upheld Congress's spending power legislation, but
the lower federal courts have also been reluctant to find such legisla-
tion unconstitutional. 219 The federal courts of appeals have been par-
ticularly wary of challenges to Spending Clause legislation brought
under the coercion theory. 220
219 Dole, 483 U.S. at 213 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
217 Id. at 214-15. The condition was over-inclusive, she reasoned, because a minimum
drinking age of twenty-one would stop persons younger than twenty-one from drinking
even when they were not driving on the interstate highways; the condition was under-
inclusive because persons younger than twenty-one pose only a fraction of the national
drunken driving problem. M.
215 Id. at 215. justice O'Connor further warned:
If the spending power is to be limited only by Congress' notion of the general
welfare, the reality, given the vast financial resources of the Federal Govern-
ment, is that the Spending Clause gives "power to the Congress to tear down
the barriers, to invade the states' jurisdiction, and to become a parliament of
the whole people, subject to no restrictions save such as are self-imposed."
Id. at 217 (quoting Butler, 297 U.S. at 78).
219 See Kansas, 214 F.3d at 1200 ("Although there may be some limit to the terms Con-
gress may impose, we have been unable to uncover any instance in which a court has in-
validated a funding condition." (quoting Oklahoma v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401, 406 (D.C.
Cir. 1981))). But see Riley, 106 F.3d at 561 (en banc) (striking down condition because the
language of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act only implicitly, at best, required
the states to provide a free appropriate public education to disabled students expelled for
reasons unrelated to their disabilities). The Tenth Circuit noted in Kansas u United States,
however, that the D.C. Circuit had overlooked United States u Butter. Kansas, 214 F.3d at
1200 n.6.
220 West Virginia, 289 F.3d at 288 (listing cases in which the circuits have expressed
strong doubts about the viability of the coercion theory); .see Kansas, 214 F.3d at 1201; Skin-
ner, 884 F.2d at 448.
1066	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 47:1033
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's en banc deci-
sion in 1997 in Virginia Department of Education v. Riley represents the
rare case in which a court struck down a spending condition. 2" In
Riley, the en banc court reversed the decision of a pane! of the circuit,
striking down a condition imposed on Virginia by the Secretary for
For example, in 2000 in Kansas, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit up-
held provisions of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act,
which conditioned the receipt of federal funds on the states' compliance with federal child
enforcement policy. See 214 F.3d at 1203. There, Kansas argued that it did not wish to
comply with the requirements because they were too onerous and expensive, but that the
state was effectively being coerced into doing so because of the amount of money at stake.
Id. at 1198. The court noted that the boundary between offering an incentive to the states
and coercing the states to comply with federal policy had never been made clear, despite
the Supreme Court's articulation of the coercion theory in cases like Steward Machine Co,
and Dole. Id. at 1202. Moreover, the Tenth Circuit reasoned, the lower courts have refused
to strike down federal legislation in cases where similarly large amounts of money were at
stake. Id.; see Schweiker, 655 F.2d at 414 (upholding Congress's conditioning of Medicaid
funds on state implementation of a provision in the Supplemental Security Income pro-
gram, even though Oklahoma stood to lose all of its Medicaid funding and risked the col-
lapse of its entire medical system if it failed to comply). Thus, the court declined to hold
that unconstitutional coercion exists when Congress conditions federal funds in such a way
that it creates a powerful incentive for states to comply with its conditions; rather, at least
in the context of the case before it, "a difficult choice remains a choice, and a tempting
offer is still but an offer." Kansas, 214 F.3d at 1203.
Similarly, in 2002 in West Virginia u U.S. Department of Health Co' Human Services, the
U.S Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld amendments to the Medicaid Act
requiring the states to adopt a program to recover certain expenditures from the estates of
deceased Medicaid beneficiaries in exchange for Medicaid funds. See 289 F.3d at 297.
There, West Virginia believed that the estate recovery program was bad public policy, but
argued that it had no choice but to comply with the program because the state was more
dependent on Medicaid funds than most other states. Id. at 287. The Fourth Circuit noted
that the Supreme Court has provided so little guidance for determining when the line
between encouragement and coercion is crossed that some courts have concluded that the
coercion theory essentially raises political questions that cannot he resolved by the courts.
Id. at. 289; see Skinner; 884 F.2d at 448 ("The difficulty, if not the impropriety of making
judicial judgments regarding a state's financial capabilities renders the coercion theory
highly suspect as a method for resolving disputes between federal and state govern-
ments."). The court conceded, however, that several judges on the Fourth Circuit had
endorsed the coercion theory only a few years earlier in Virginia Department of Education a
Riley. West Virginia, 289 F.Sd at 290; see infra notes 227-230 and accompanying text. Still, the
court declined to strike down the condition in the current case because the Medicaid Act
granted the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services the discretion to withhold funds
only from categories of the Medicaid program that were affected by a state's failure to
comply with one of the Medicaid Act's requirements. Id. at 292-93. Thus, although the
Fourth Circuit recognized that a particular sanction imposed by the Secretary may be con-
stitutionally suspect in certain cases, such was not the case for West Virginia, because the
state had only been warned that noncompliance could result in the loss of all or part of its
Medicaid funds. See id. at 285-86,292-93. The court reasoned that the "or part" qualifica-
tion saved the condition. Id. at 292-93.
"1 106 F.Sd at 560-61 (per curiam).
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receipt of its funding under the Individuals with Disabilities Educa-
tion Act ("IDEA') .222 A provision of IDEA requires the states to pro-
vide disabled students with a free appropriate public education. 223
Virginia adopted a policy under which it ceased providing such edu-
cation to disabled students expelled or suspended for reasons unre-
lated to their disabilities. 224 The Secretary responded by threatening
to withhold Virginia's entire* $60 million IDEA grant if it did not
amend its policy. 223 The Fourth Circuit held that the plain language .
of IDEA did not even implicitly condition the receipt of IDEA funds
on the provision of education to expelled and suspended students;
thus, the Secretary violated Dole's second restriction that conditions
on federal funding be unambiguous when he threatened to withhold
Virginia's funds. 228
Although the court did not hold on Dole's coercion theory, six
judges adopted the dissenting panel opinion of Judge Luttig, which dis-
cussed the Tenth Amendment implications of the condition imposed by
the Secretary. 227 Judge Luttig argued that, if the coercion theory has any
reach at all, "a Tenth Amendment claim of the highest order" exists
where the federal government withholds the entirety of a substantial
federal grant on the basis that a state refuses to fulfill its federal obliga-
tion in some insubstantial respect. 228 That Virginia faced such a penalty
because it refused to acquiesce in federal policy for school discipline was
particularly troubling. 229 Citing Justice O'Connor's dissent in Dote, Judge
Luttig suggested that the condition in this case might not only be im-
permissible coercion, but also unconstitutional regulation in the guise
of a spending condition. 230
222 Id. at 561.
2" 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (2000).
224 Riley, 106 F.3d at 560 (per curiam).
2" Id.
226 Id. at 561; see Dole, 483 U.S. at 207; see also Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17,
227 See Riley, 106 F.3d at 561, 569-72 (Luttig,
228 hi at 570; see West Virginia, 289 F.3(.1 at 291 (stating that, after Riley, the coercion
theory remains viable in the Fourth Circuit, so that federal statutes that threaten the loss
of an entire block of federal funds upon a relatively minor failing by a state are constitu-
tionally suspect).
229 Riley, 106 F.3d at 569 (Luttig, J.) (noting that the Department of Education was
withholding funds based on Virginia's refusal to surrender control over "one of its most
effective tools for maintaining order" and that Congress was thus sharply curtailing the
state's local autonomy over student discipline).
226 Id.; see Dole, 483 U.S. at 215-18 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Contra Jim C. v. United
States, 235 F.3ti 1079, 1081-82 (8th Cir. 2000) (en bane) (reversing the judgment of a
panel of the circuit and holding that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 does not unconstitu-
tionally coerce the states into waiving their Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity,
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E. Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy:
Toward a More Rigorous Interpretation of the Spending Clause
In June 2006, the Supreme Court issued a significant decision in-
dicating that the Court may begin to interpret the reach of Congress's
Spending Clause laws more narrowly. 231 in Arlington Central School Dis-
trict Board of Education v. Murphy, the Court held that parents prevailing
in actions brought against school districts under IDEA may not recover
the costs of experts used for litigation purposes. 232 Noting that its deci-
sion was "guided by" the fact that IDEA had been enacted pursuant to
the Spending Clause, the Court focused on whether IDEA provided
"clear notice" to the states that they would be required to compensate
parents for the cost of experts as a condition to receiving IDEA
funds. 23 The Court decided that IDEA did not provide such notice,
because the text of the statute indicated that the costs of experts were
not recoverable, and because the Court had so interpreted similar pro-
visions in prior cases. 234 The respondents argued that a statement in a
congressional conference committee report proved that Congress in-
tended the states to compensate prevailing parents for expert costs, but
the Court reasoned that this legislative history was not sufficient to pro-
vide the notice required by the Spending Clause. 235
The Court's decision in Murphy indicates a turn, because, as Justice
Ginsburg pointed out in her concurrence, the majority could have
reached the same result without considering the Spending Clause ques-
tion. 236 Moreover, Justice Breyer argued in his dissent that the Court
has not, under Pennhurst's (and later Dole's) clear statement rule, re-
quired Congress to identify specifically each and every condition in a
Spending Clause statute. 237 To Justice Breyer, the proper question was
not whether IDEA provided clear notice to the states, but rather
because "[t]he sacrifice of all federal education funds „ would be politically painful, but
we cannot say that it compels Arkansas's choice").
231 See Murphy, 126 S. CL at 2458-59, 2463; Posting of Marty Lederman to SCOTUSbIog,
http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/2006/06/25-week/  (June 28, 2006, 09:22
EST) [hereinafter Posting of Marty Lederman].
252 Murphy, 126 S. Ct. at 2461.
233 Id. at 2458-59. The Court's clear notice requirement came from Pennhurst, where
the Court had stated that because "legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is
much in the nature of a contract," recipients of federal funds must accept federally im-
posed conditions "voluntarily and knowingly." See id. at 2459 (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S.
at 17).
234 Id. at 2460-63.
255 Id. at 2463.
236 Id. at 2464 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
237 See Murphy, 126 S. CL at 2470-71 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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whether the states would have accepted IDEA funds had they only known
about the condition—here, to compensate prevailing parents for ex-
pert costs. 28 Thus, the Justices disagreed over how rigorously the
Spending Clause doctrine should be applied, and the Justices who fa-
vored a more rigorous interpretation prevailed in this case. 259
V. CONNECTICUT V. SPELLINGS UNDER SOUTH DAKOTA V. DOLE: THE
No CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT SHOULD NOT (BUT MOST
LIKELY WILL) SURVIVE SPENDING CLAUSE SCRUTINY
Because Connecticut challenges the Secretary's denial of its
waiver requests under the Spending Clause, a reviewing court would
apply the U.S. Supreme Court's South Dakota v. Dole test. 240 Although
the courts have generally upheld federal spending legislation (with
the exception of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
Virginia Department of Education v. Riley), Connecticut's claims should
258 Id. at 2471. In any event, Justice Breyer believed that the legislative history, held in-
sufficient to provide clear notice by the majority, made Congress's purpose, and thus the
meaning of the IDEA provision at issue, sufficiently clear to hold the states responsible for
compensating prevailing parents. See id. at 2474-75.
239 See Posting of Marty Lederman, supra note 231. The Connecticut Attorney General
has filed a notice with the court in the state's litigation, noting that Murphy supports the
state's position that Connecticut cannot be obligated to spend its own funds to comply with
NCLB because the unfunded mandates provision is ambiguous at best. See Mark Walsh,
Cann. Sees Legal Boost for Its NCLB Suit, EDUC. WEEK, July 12, 2006, at 34; Press Release, Conn.
Attorney General's Office, Attorney General Says U.S. Supreme Court Decision Significantly
Supports State's NCLB Lawsuit ( July 13, 2006), available at http://www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/
view.asp?Q=317586&A=2426.
549 See 483 U.S. 203, 207-11 (1987); Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 42-
43. Any court deciding a Spending Clause challenge, especially with respect to federal
legislation as comprehensive as NCLB, would likely be mindful of the wide-reaching impli-
cations of striking down such legislation. See generally West Virginia v. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., 289 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2002); Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196 (10th
Or. 2000). In light of recent limitations on Congress's power to enact legislation under the
Commerce Clause, Congress may increasingly rely on its power to impose conditions on
the states in exchange for federal funds to implement policies it otherwise would not have
the authority to enact, but courts may hesitate to affect further the federalism balance. See
Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its
Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459,
510-11 (2003). See generally United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); New York V. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). Still, no mat-
ter how creatively a court may apply it, Dole is nonetheless the law in spending cases. See
West Virginia, 289 F.3d at 289; Kansas, 214 F.3d at 1198; Va. Dep't of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d
559, 561 (4th Cir. 1997) (en bane), superseded by statute, IDEA Amendments for 1997, Pub.
L. No. 105-17, § 612,111 Stat. 37, 60.
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persuade a court to apply the Dole test more aggressively. 241 Not only
has the federal government intruded upon the states' traditional edu-
cation power, but NCLB also threatens local control over public
schools, which the Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez insisted is essential to maintaining a valuable diver-
sity of approaches to education pa-tic-y. 242
In Dole, the Court listed five general restrictions on Congress's
power to impose conditions on the states in exchange for the receipt
of federal funds: (1) Congress's exercise of the spending power must
be in pursuit of the general welfare, (2) Congress must condition the
states' receipt of federal funds unambiguously, (3) the conditions im-
posed must be reasonably related to a national interest, (4) the condi-
tions imposed must not violate any other constitutional provision, and
(5) Congress may not condition the states' receipt of federal funds in
a coercive way. 243 Connecticut specifically challenges the Secretary's
denials of its waiver requests, which a court may be more likely to sus-
tain than a facial challenge because of courts' general reluctance to
disturb spending legislation. 244 Nevertheless, a reviewing court might
uphold NCLB, even in the face of Connecticut's more limited claims,
though this Note argues that such a holding would be wrong under a
careful application of Dole. 245
First, NCLB would survive Dolls first restriction requiring that
the Act be passed in pursuit of the general welfare. 246 The Supreme
Court and the lower courts have all generally deferred to Congress on
this issue. 247 Moreover, although critics disagree about whether NGLB
achieves its goals, the Act is plainly aimed at the very same public
purpose that education reformers have been working toward for dec-
ades: equal opportunity and quality education for all students. 248
Whether NGLB would survive Dole's second restriction, however,
which requires that all conditions imposed on the states' receipt of
141 See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 42-43; supra notes 219-221 and
accompanying text.
242 See 411 U.S. 1, 49-53 (1973).
245 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-11.
244 See West Virginia, 289 F.3d at 292 (noting that West Virginia was effectively mounting
a facial challenge to the challenged Medicaid provisions, so that the state bore the "very
heavy burden" of showing that the provisions could not operate constitutionally under any
circumstances).
245 See infra notes 246-277 and accompanying text.
246 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
247 See id.; Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143-44 (1947). See generally
West Virginia, 289 F.3d 281; Kansas, 214 F.3d 1196.
248 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (Supp. III 2003).
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federal funds provide states with clear notice, is less obvious. 249 Any
claim Connecticut could make that its obligation to comply generally
with the Act's requirements'ivas unclear would be dubious at best. 250
Unlike in the 1981 case of Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Haider-
man, where the Supreme Court struck down a condition because it
found Pennsylvania and the other states had not knowingly and vol-
untarily accepted the condition, Connecticut and the other states are
clearly aware that they must comply with specific conditions to receive
funds under NCLB. 25' Still, Connecticut's argument is more subtle
and complex than this. 252 One of the state's basic allegations with re-
spect to Dole's second restriction is that Connecticut believed that,
under the "unfunded mandates" provision, it would not be forced to
comply with NCLB's mandates unless Congress provided the state
with sufficient funds to do sato
Excluding Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Mur-
phy, the only recent case striking down a condition based on Dole's
second restriction is the 1997 case of Virginia Department of Education u.
Riley. 254 In Riley, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
struck down a condition the Department had imposed on Virginia,
requiring the state to provide public education under IDEA to dis-
abled students expelled for reasons unrelated to their disabilities,
where Virginia had a policy denying such students public educa-
tion.255 The basis for the court's opinion in Riley was that IDEA nei-
ther implied that states were required to provide public education in
such circumstances, nor clearly stated this condition. 256
Unlike the condition at issue in Riley, NGLB's unfunded man-
dates provision is expressly included in the Act. 257 The question thus
becomes whether the language of the provision is so ambiguous that
Connecticut must be granted its own understanding of the provi-
249 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207; Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17
(1981); see also Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2459
(2006) (stating the clear notice requirement).
259 See generally 20 U.S.C. § 6301.
251 See451 U.S. at 18-19.
252 See Second Amended Complaint, .supra note 16, at 42-43.
255 Id.
254 Riley, 106 F.3d at 561 (per curiam); see Murphy, 126 S. Ct. at 2461 (holding that the
terms of the IDEA statute failed to provide the state clear notice that prevailing parents
may recover the costs of experts or consultants); supra notes 231-239 and accompanying
text.
255 Riley, 106 F.3d at 561.
256 Id.
257 See 20 U.S.C. § 7907(a) (Supp. III 2003); cf. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17.
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sion. 25 Still, even if the language of the unfunded mandates provision
is somewhat ambiguous, accepting Connecticut's interpretation that
the federal government must provide all funds necessary for imple-
menting NCLB's mandates would effectively enable the reviewing
court to saddle Congress with a burden it may not have intended. 259
Connecticut also argues, alternatively, that the state accepted fed-
eral funds under NCLB based on the state's understanding that the
Secretary would waive any provision of the Act that conflicted with sub-
stantiated state policy. 26° This argument presents an even more difficult
question than the unfunded mandates argument, because the Act does
not require the Secretary to grant any state's waiver request, and thus
her discretion is very wide. 261 Any ambiguity in the Secretary's waiver
authority should be resolved in favor of Connecticut under Dole, but
the Secretary could easily argue that the state knew that her waiver au-
thority was both broad and discretionary, and that there was no guaran-
tee that she would make exceptions for any particular state policy.262 Of
course, such an argument is an affront to federalism. 263 The Supreme
238 See 20 U.S.C. § 7907(a). At least one scholar has argued that Connecticut's claim is
legally strong, because the unfunded mandates provision's language is explicit and be-
cause Connecticut is one of the country's highest-achieving states and thus would make a
"sympathetic plaintiff." Dillon, supra note 135. But see Sch. Dist. of the City of Pontiac v.
Spellings, No. 05-cv-71535-DT, 2005 WI. 3149545, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 23, 2005) (finding
that the unfunded mandates provision prohibits federal officials from requiring the states
to spend their own funds, but that Congress is not prohibited from doing so); Michael
Heise, No Lawsuit 141 Behind: Chief Justice Roberts, the Schoolmaster?, DIM. NEXT, Winter
2006, at 7, 7 (predicting that Connecticut's lawsuit will probably fail in court, but arguing
that both Connecticut's and the NEA's lawsuits may be politically effective in diluting
NCLB's requirements).
9S9 See Pontiac, 2005 WL 3149545, at *4 (finding that if Congress had meant to fund all
of NCLB's requirements fully, it would have said so clearly and unambiguously); Reply in
Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 12-13, Connecticut v. Spellings, No. 3:05-cv-
01330 (MRK) (D. Conn. Jan. 13, 2006) (arguing that Connecticut's interpretation of the
unfunded mandates provision assumes that the federal government took on a primary role
of fiscal responsibility for education under NCLB, which is contrary to congressional in-
tent).
26° See 20 U.S.C. § 7861(a); Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 42-43; supra
notes 117-118 and accompanying text.
281 See 20 U.S.C. § 7861. In fact, although a full discussion of the Secretary's argument
on this point is beyond the scope of this Note, the Secretary contends that her discretion
to grant waivers under NCLB is not subject to judicial review. See Memorandum of Law in
Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 51-55, Spellings, No. 3:05-cv-01330 (MRK)
(Dec. 2, 2005).
262 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
263 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564-66 (characterizing education power as within state sover-
eignty and expressing concern about Congress's ability to intrude on that power by regu-
lating local schools).
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Court indicated in Murphy that it may be more likely to strike down
federal funding conditions, but the condition at issue in that case was
more discrete than NCLB's waiver provision. 2"
Third, NCLB would most likely survive Dole's third restriction re-
quiring that the Act be rationally related to a federal interest. 265 The
federal government believes that testing and the subsequent availability
of test scores to the public is the key to boosting the quality of educa-
tion for all students. 266 Under Justice O'Connor's over-inclusive/under-
inclusive analysis, articulated in her dissent in Dole, the NCLB provi-
sions challenged by Connecticut might be considered over-broad. 267
For instance, NCLB requires that all students be tested, even though
only some categories of students have historically suffered from poor
education. 26" The federal government might respond, however, that
all students must be tested so that lower scores can be compared with
higher scores. 269 In any event, Connecticut does not challenge the
rational relationship of the provisions it seeks to have waived. 270
Finally, NCLB should not survive Dole's last restriction, which re-
quires that the Act not so coerce Connecticut into complying with its
mandates that pressure turns into compulsion."' Should a court fol-
low the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's lead in Riley
and actually apply the restriction, the court would probably find the
Secretary's refusal to grant Connecticut's waiver requests here to be
unconstitutionally coercive. 272 Nevertheless, courts generally hesitate
to delve into this uncertain area of Spending Clause law. 2"
264 See 20 U.S.C. § 7861; Murphy, 126 S. Ct. at 2461.
265 See 483 U.S. at 207-08.
266 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (Supp. III 2003) ("[The purpose of this Act can be accomplished
by] ensuring that high-quality academic assessments, accountability systems, teacher
preparation and training, curriculum, and instructional materials are aligned with chal-
lenging State academic standards so that students, teachers, parents, and administrators
can measure progress against common expectations for student academic achievement
267 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 214-15 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
266 See20U.S.C. § 6311(b) (3).
262 See id. § 6301.
276 See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 42-43.
vi See 483 U.S. at 211; Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548,590 (1937). The De-
partment of Education has stressed that states that do not wish to comply with NCLB's
requirements are free to avoid those requirements by turning down the funding. Hendrie,
supra note 7.
2" See Riley, 106 F.3d at 569-72 (Luttig, j.); see also West Virginia, 289 F.3d at 290. See gen-
erally Coulter M. Bump, Note, Reviving the Coercion Test: A Proposal to Prevent Federal Condi-
tional Spending That Leaves Children Behind, 76 U. Coto. L REV. 521 (2005) (arguing that,
particularly in the context of NCLB, the Supreme Court should revive the coercion analy-
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Again, the only recent case to apply the coercion restriction is
Riley, although the holding did not concern the restriction. 274 Judge
Luttig, joined by five other judges in an en banc decision, stated that
"a Tenth Amendment claim of the highest order" exists where the fed-
eral government withholds the entirety of a substantial federal grant
on the basis that a state refuses to fulfill its federal obligation in some
insubstantial respect, as the government had threatened to do in that
case. 275 The requirements Connecticut seeks to have waived here are
more substantial than the requirement the Fourth Circuit took issue
with in Riley: there, Virginia withheld public education from only a
relatively small number of expelled students, while Connecticut has
asked to be relieved of its obligations under key provisions of
NCLB.27° Nevertheless, as with most of Dole's restrictions, the coercion
restriction is flexible enough to accommodate either result. 277
Ultimately, if the states' ability to experiment with education pol-
icy is to survive, a reviewing court should find NCLB as currently ad-
ministered to be unconstitutionally coercive under Dole. 278 The fed-
eral government's role in education has only increased since it first
enacted the Elementary and Secondary Education Act in 1965, and
this role shows signs of further expansion. 279
sis from Steward Machine Co. to create effective limits on the reach of congressional spend-
ing power).
275 See Kansas, 214 F.3d at 1202-03; Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 447-48 (9th Cir.
1989); Oklahoma v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Jesse H. Choper, The
Supreme Court and Unconstitutional Conditions: Federalism and Individual Rights, 4 CORN F.I.L
J.L. & PUB, Poer 460, 464 (1995) (arguing that the Supreme Court has failed to strike
down federal spending legislation even when coercion has "stared the Court in the face").
274 See Riley, 214 F.3d at 569-72 (Luttig, J.).
375 See id. at 570.
375 See id.; Letter from Margaret Spellings to Betty J. Sternberg, supra note 141 ("The
significance of the(] assessments [required under NCLB] cannot be understated."). The
importance of administering standardized tests in every grade has been a key point of
contention between the Secretary and the Commissioner. Compare Spellings, supra note
160 ("Teachers cannot remedy weaknesses they don't see. The whole point of assessing
students regularly is to catch problems early so they can be fixed before it's too late."), with
Letter from Betty J. Sternberg to Margaret Spellings, supra note 157 (`°The U.S. Depart-
ment of Education sees every-year testing as a 'principle,' while Connecticut sees it as a
'practice'—one that, in our state, will actually be detrimental to the goal of leaving no
child behind.").
277 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 211-12.
2" See id.
" See Address at the National Newspaper Association Government Affairs Conference,
42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc, 434 (Mar. 10, 2006) (stating that the President would like to
extend math assessments to the higher grades). See generally OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y, U.S.
DEP'T OF EDUC., MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF A CHANGING WORLD: STRENGTHENING EDU-
CATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2006), available at http://www.ed.gov/aboutlinits/ed/
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VI. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND SAN ANTONIO INDEPENDENT
SCHOOL DISTRICT V. RODRIGUEZ UNDER DOLE'S FOURTH
RESTRICTION: A POSSIBLE INDEPENDENT CONSTITUTIONAL BAR TO
CONGRESS'S CONDITIONING FEDERAL FUNDS ON STATE COMPLIANCE
WITH THE No CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT
As discussed in Part V, any court reviewing Connecticut's claims
under South Dakota v. Dole would likely uphold the Secretary's denial of
Connecticut's waiver requests. 28° Even if Connecticut were to succeed
on its claim that the Secretary is violating Dole's second restriction, Con-
gress could easily rectify a court ruling striking down the relevant provi-
sions of NCLB on these grounds by amending the Act. 281 A reviewing
court should, however, apply the Dole test more aggressively in Con-
necticut's case and find another ground on which to strike down the
provisions of NCLB that Connecticut challenges, at least as they are
currently administered by the Secretary. 282 Dolls fourth independent
constitutional bar restriction should provide such a ground. 283
In Dole, the Court listed five general restrictions on Congress's
power to impose conditions on the states in exchange for the receipt
of federal funds. 284 The fourth restriction provides that conditions
imposed must not violate any other constitutional provision. 285 The
Court stated that the Tenth Amendment alone does not act as a con-
stitutional bar; rather, the Court described the restriction as the unex-
competitiveness/strengthening/strengthening.pdf (setting forth President George W.
Bush's 2096 education agenda, including plans to improve math, science, and foreign lan-
guage in public high schools).
288 See supra notes 246-279 and accompanying text. See generally South Dakota v. Dole,
483 U.S. 203 (1987). This analysis assumes, however, that the Supreme Court's recent fed-
eralism decisions with respect to the Commerce Clause do not foreshadow a similar shift in
its Spending Clause jurisprudence. See Baker & Berman, supra note 240, at 510-11 (argu-
ing that if Congress attempts to evade the Court's federalism decisions by exploiting Dole
in order to legislate in areas of traditional state concern, the Court will tighten the Dole
standard or abandon it entirely); Choper, supra note 273, at 465 (arguing that if the Court
chooses to become active in the Spending Clause area, there is room for it to expand its
authority to review spending legislation that imposes unconstitutional conditions on the
states); supra note 240.
281 See IDEA Amendments for 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, § 612,111 Stat. 37,60 (super-
seding the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's decision in Virginia Department of
Education v. Riley, which struck down a condition the Department had imposed on the
states in exchange for receipt of IDEA funds, almost immediately after that case was de-
cided).
282 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 208-10.
283 See id.
284 Id. at 207-11.
285 Id. at 208.
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ceptionable proposition that the power may not be used to induce the
states to engage in activities that would themselves be unconstitu-
tional. 286 As examples of the type of conditions that would violate this
fourth restriction, the Court offered a grant of federal funds condi-
tioned on invidiously discriminatory state action, or the infliction of
cruel and unusual punishment. 287
In Connecticut's case, the potential for liability to its public
school students under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause should serve as an independent constitutional bar to NCLB as
it is currently administered. 288 If the Secretary prevails in Connecti-
cut's lawsuit, Connecticut may ultimately lose its education funds un-
der Title I. 289 A Connecticut statute effectively prohibits the state from
using any of its own funds to implement NCLB's requirements; thus,
faced with insufficient federal funding, Connecticut will not be able to
comply with NCLB as currently mandated. 29° Not only would Con-
necticut lose federal funds it had been using to comply with NCLB,
286 1d. at 210.
2" Dole, 493 U.S. at 210-11; cf. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194,
214 (2003) (upholding condition on public libraries' receipt of federal funds requiring
them to use filtering software on their computers to block access to obscene material on
the Internet, because libraries' use of the software did not violate patrons' First Amend-
ment rights, and thus the condition did not induce the libraries to violate the Constitu-
tion).
288 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides,
in relevant part: "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." Id.
289 Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 16. In its complaint, Connecticut
states that the state of Utah formally asked the Secretary about the consequences of opting
out of NCLB's requirements. Id. The Secretary responded that Utah would lose not only
its Tide I funds, but also any other funds allotted according to the Title formula Id.; see
NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 13, at 49 (noting the same, and
characterizing the Secretary's response as "raising the stakes for nonparticipation" in
NCLB as compared to previous versions of Title I).
Since NCLB was enacted, at least three states have been fined for failing to comply
with some of the Act's mandates. Rob Ftotakainen, No State Left Untouched by Education Law,
STAR TRIR., May 9, 2005, at 1A. In April 2005, Texas was fined $444,282—the second-
largest fine ever imposed by the Department—for allowing 9% of its disabled students to
use alternative tests, in violation of the then-federal limit of 1%. Id. In 2003, Minnesota was
fined $113,000 when it substituted graduation rates and attendance records for test scores
to show progress, and Georgia was fined $783,327 for failing to establish its state testing
scheme. Id.
Moreover, the Department recently released its designations of the states for comply-
ing with NCLB's testing provisions. Lynn Olson, Department Raps States on Testing, Enuc.
WEEK, July 12, 2006, at 1. Four states were designated as "full approval"; eleven states re-
ceived designations such that some federal funds will be redirected to local districts. See id.
Connecticut was designated as "approval expected." Id.
290 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-14n (g) (2005).
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but it could also lose funds it has relied on since the original enact-
ment of the Title I program more than forty years ago to maintain its
own education policies. 291
Consider this scenario: several years from now, if NCLB is even
somewhat successful in moving toward its goal of equal educational
opportunity and quality education for all students, the children in
most states will have substantially similar levels of education measur-
able by similar standards. 292 In contrast, children from any state that
has not participated in NCLB—either because of insufficient funding
or simply by the state's choice—will probably not have that same level
of education, because those states will be struggling to recover from
the loss of Title I funds they had received for over forty years. 293 If
those children decide to file a lawsuit against their states because they
have not received the same level of education as all of the other chil-
dren in the nation, due in large part to the fact that their states have
not received the federal funds that other states have, will those chil-
dren substantiate a valid equal protection claim? 294
This Note argues that they would, and thus that the Fourteenth
Amendment should stand as an independent constitutional bar to
NCLB as it is currently administered. 295 Admittedly, the Court in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, based on the state of
education in 1973, would probably say n0. 296 In Rodriguez, the Su-
preme Court held that Texas's school financing system, which had a
disproportionate impact on public school students in low-property-
wealth districts in the state, did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 297 The Court determined that
wealth, in and of itself, is not a suspect classification entitled to strict
scrutiny upon judicial review. 298 Thus, applying rational basis review
to the state's school financing system, the Court held that the system
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because it reasonably fur-
291 See 46 CONN. S. PROC., pt. 9, 2003 Sess. 2626, 2635 (May 2L 2003) (statement of
Sen. Gaffey) ("How the heck is Connecticut going to turn around and say, oh, we don't
want to comply and you can keep the $200 million you give us in Title I monies. Everybody
around this circle knows that we can't afford to refuse $200 million in Title I monies that
our school children are entitled to."); Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 16.
292 Cf. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist v Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 19, 24 (1973).
293 cf. id.
294 Cf. id. at 19, 24, 28.
296 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see Dole, 483 U.S. at 208-10.
296 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 54-55.
297 Id.
2" See id at 22-25. The Court also held that education is not a fundamental right af-
forded explicit protection under the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 35.
1078	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 47:1033
thered Texas's legitimate interest in maintaining local control over
the state's schools. 2"
At the time of the Rodriguez decision, however, the states and local
districts controlled education policy. 300 Moreover, the U.S. Supreme
Court was largely concerned with two issues in that case: (1) the Rodri-
guez plaintiffs could not articulate a discrete class in equal protection
terms; and (2) the plaintiffs had not been absolutely deprived of educa-
tion, and any other difference in quality of education was not measur-
able, 301
Although "students in Connecticut" may not be a classification
"saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of pur-
poseful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the ma-
joritarian political process"—the classifications the Court typically sub-
jects to strict scrutiny—"students in Connecticut" is certainly a dis-
crete class. 302 More significantly, with NCLB's standards and rankings,
an absolute denial of education perhaps may not be necessary to find
an Equal Protection Clause violation, because a certain, measurable
level of quality education may begin to emerge. 303
The question becomes whether Connecticut's rationale for fail-
ing to comply with NCLB—namely, that its state law prohibited the
use of state funds for NCLB's mandates and that it disagreed with
federal policy choices—would stand up to strict scrutiny. 3" Connecti-
cut has an interest in developing its own education policies pursuant
to the power reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment, but
it is not clear whether this interest is compelling enough to survive
strict scrutiny. 303 Furthermore, even if a reviewing court refused to
299 Id. at 55.
300 See id. at 99-53.
3° 1 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 19.
303 Id. at 28; cf. id. at 22-28.
363 See Dayton et al., supra note 67, at 10-11 (arguing that future school funding plain-
tiffs will assert that the states have a constitutional duty of accountability, as defined in
NCLB and state accountability legislation, as part of their duty to provide an adequate
education for all of the states' students); Heise, supra note 258, at 7 (noting that school
funding disputes are increasingly cast in a way to implicate NCLB); Bill Scanlon, Educators:
State at Risk to School-Funding Lawsuits, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, July 22,2005, at 26A (quot-
ing a school finance expert as saying that although states have defended themselves against
school funding lawsuits in the past by demonstrating that they had equalized spending
among districts, courts have recently started to insist that states provide adequate funding
to move closer to NCLB's goals). See generally 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (Supp. III 2003).
5°4 Cf. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 16-17 (noting that the state had conceded that its financ-
ing system would not stand up to strict scrutiny).
303 See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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apply strict scrutiny, there would still be the question of whether
Connecticut's rationale would stand up to rational basis review. 306 The
answer could be yes, because, in light of widespread criticism of
NCLB's policies, it might be reasonable for Connecticut to believe
that it can do better. 907 The Secretary might argue, however, that
Connecticut's achievement gap is quite large, and thus that such a
belief would not be reasonable. 308 In any event, this Note argues that
the viability of this type of equal protection claim demonstrates that •
Congress and the Secretary are compelling Connecticut, albeit indi-
rectly, to violate its public school students' Fourteenth Amendment
rights, 309
The argument that NCLB would lead Connecticut to violate its
students' Fourteenth Amendment rights if the Secretary does not
waive the requirements the state lacks funds for and disagrees with
deviates somewhat from the independent constitutional bar restric-
tion as the Supreme Court envisioned it in Dole. 31° One could argue
that unlike the expenditures envisioned by Dole, such as funds condi-
tioned on infliction of cruel and unusual punishment, here it is only
if Connecticut does not comply with the conditions that it would vio-
late the Constitution. 311 But in reality, the damage has already been
done. Not only have all forty-nine other states created academic stan-
dards in accordance with NCLB (all approved by the Secretary) so
that Connecticut's students could use them against the state in an
equal protection lawsuit, but even Connecticut itself has already cre-
ated similar standards." At the time, of course, it was operating un-
der the belief that the unfunded mandates provision meant what it
says, and that the Secretary would use his or her waiver authority
thoughtfully." It is NCLB, by suddenly and forcibly conditioning the
states' receipt of Title I funds that they had received for decades on
3°6 cf. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 55. At least two scholars argue that NCLB's accountability
standards will enable plaintiffs to prove intentional discrimination for the purposes of
Equal Protection Clause claims, simply by producing information that the states them-
selves have generated as required under the Act. Liebman & Sabel, supra note 69, at 297.
Thus, these scholars argue, the burden will be on the schools to explain to the courts why
they have not been able to meet their own targets, particularly when other schools in the
state have met those targets. Set id.
3" See supra notes 119-130 and accompanying text.
3°5 See supra notes 141,160 and accompanying text.
3°9 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 210-11.
310 Cf. id. at 208-10.
1" Cf. id.
sit See 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b) (3) (C) (i)—(ii) (Supp. III 2003).
515 See Olson, supra note 289.
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the creation of new academic standards, without actually providing
funding adequate to meet those very standards, that causes states like
Connecticut to run afoul of the Fourteenth Arnendment. 314
Moreover, this Fourteenth Amendment question is a step re-
moved from Connecticut's claims in the lawsuit, but it nevertheless
demonstrates the extent to which federal policy, in the form of NCLB,
could continue to dominate the education reform arena not only leg-
islatively, but also in the courts. 515 Although an Equal Protection
Clause analysis under Rodriguez involves anticipating the future effects
of a loss for Connecticut in its lawsuit, the repercussions of Connecti-
cut submitting to federal coercion to follow federal policy, and thus
giving up local control of its schools, are potentially great.s 16
Ultimately, Connecticut's challenge to NCLB illustrates the extent
to which the federal government, through the Secretary, has pre-
empted the states' ability to make policy choices about education. 317
The clash between Connecticut and the Secretary has landed in court,
yet school funding lawsuits demonstrate that the courts are unable to
contribute significantly to education reform when there is no political
will to reform. 318 A more cooperative, and less combative, relationship
between the Secretary and states like Connecticut could allow NCLB to
flourish as one approach to education policy, rather than as the only ap-
proach, because the states would not waste energy and resources resist-
ing the Act. 319
CONCLUSION
Thirty years after the U.S. Supreme Court sent education re-
formers away to resolve inequity concerns at the state level, the fed-
eral court system—and potentially the Supreme Court itself—faces a
doubly troubling challenge. Not only has the federal government
reached into the states and local school districts in an unprecedented
way, but this step also threatens Connecticut and other states with a
514 See Id.; Tee also§ 6311 (b) (3) (C) (i)—( ii).
315 See generally Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16.
315 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 49-53.
517 See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 1-16.
51/1 See Dayton & Dupre, supra note 39, at 2910-11; Rebell & Hughes, supra note 86, at
101-13; Thro, supra note 70, at 482-89; see also Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent.
Sch, Dist., Westchester County v. Rowley, 958 U.S. 176, 208 (1982) ("We have previously
cautioned that courts lack the 'specialized knowledge and experience' necessary to resolve
'persistent and difficult questions of educational policy.'" (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at
42)).
319 See Salzman, supra note 166.
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hard choice: either subject themselves to coercion and accept the
federal government's funds, or risk equal protection liability should
their students challenge their decisions to follow their own policies
and thereby forego federal funds.
Even if Congress has taken a step in the right direction toward
effective education reform with the No Child Left Behind Act, the Act
cannot be the only possible right step—education reformers have
been working toward the same goal for decades, and even they have
not achieved much success. The Secretary should use her power to
waive provisions of NCLB more respectfully so that the states can con-
tinue to experiment with a diversity of approaches to education re-
form. Likewise, Congress should fund NCLB more fully so that the
states can comply with the Act's requirements, but reserve their own
funds for expenditure on their own policy choices.
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